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SUMMARY: These curve-lined petns raise issues as to 
the government's access to government contractors' business 
records under the access-to-records statutes, 10 u.s.c. 
§2313(b} and 41 u.s.c. §254(c}. In No. 81-1273, the SG con-
tends that these access provisions give the Comptroller General 
the authority to demand information about contractors' indirect 
and unallocated costs (such as R & D and marketing costs} . In 
No. 81-14 72, Merck files a conditional cross petn contending 
that its cost records are not "directly pert in en t" to its 
fixed-price government contracts, and that the Comptroller Gen-
eral exceeded his limited audit authority by demanding private 
company cost data for individual congressmen and for the pur-
pose of conducting a general survey of drug industry economics. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: . In four separate fixed-
priced contracts, Merck contracted with the DOD and the VA for 
the sale of pharmaceuticals. The contracts totaled more than 
$2.8 million. As required by statute, each contract contained 
an access-to-records provision stating that the u.s. had "ac-
cess to and the right to examine any directly pertinent records 
of the contractor • involving transactions related to [this 
contract]." The Comptroller General requested access to 
Merck's records. Merck refused to comply, instead filing the 
present action for declaratory and injunctive relief against 
the government. 
The DC rejected Merck's argument that the government's 
request was based on the assertedly improper purpose of survey-
3. 
ing the pharmaceutical industry rather than the concededly 
proper purpose of assuring that the contract price was reason-
able and appropriate. The DC also rejected Merck's argument 
that the government's request exceeded statutory authority be-
cause no cost record could "directly pertain" to a contract in 
which price was set by prior negotiation and agreement rather 
than on a cost-plus basis. The court, however, did restrict 
the government's scope of access to Merck's cost records. On 
this issue, the DC denied the government access to Merck's in-
direct and unallocated costs of research and development, mar-
keting, promotion, distribution, and administration. 
Both sides appealed. Pending decision, this Court 
V affirmed Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F.Supp. 1388 (SDNY 
1977), aff'd 620 F.2d 17 (CA2 1~0), aff'd by an equally divid-
ed Court, 451 U.~. 400 (1981) (rejecting government's interpre-
tation of access-to-records provisions) (Justice Stewart not 
/ 
participating). The CADC then affirmed in a per curiam. The 
majority cited conflicting decisions by lower courts on the 
issues presented and stated that the conflict "must be resolved 
by the Supreme Court, not by us, and we believe that nothing 
would be gained by a replowing of the field." The CADC accord-
ing affirmed the DC "without more." Judge Mikva dissented in 
part. His 28-page opinion concluded that "Congress intended to 
give the Comptroller General exactly the sort of authority he 
seeks to exert here." 
SG'S CONTENTIONS IN NO. 1273: This case raises the 
' . 
4. 
same important issue that the Court considered but left unre-
solved last term in Staats v. Bristol Laboratories, 451 u.s. 
400 (1981) : the scope of ths Comptroller General's right to 
request records from government contractors pursuant to con-
tractual provisions requiring the statute to be included in all 
non-advertised government contracts in excess of $10,000. The 
CADC, CA2, and CA3 have disagreed with the CA7 on the proper 
construction of identical government contract language. This 
encourages forum shopping and could lead to a lack of coopera-
tion by contactors in numerous industries. The CADC' s con-
struction erred in rejecting the GAO's longstanding interpreta-
tion of the access-to-records provision. If allowed to stand, 
the decision below will limit GAO's authority to inquire into 
the appropriateness of contract prices and will hamper scrutiny 
of significant unallocated costs. This is a result Congress 
never intended. 
MERCK'S CONTENTIONS IN NO. 1273: The conflicting CA 
decisions have been spawned by a unique congressional attempt 
to use the GAO's access-to-records authority. The impact of 
the decisions in these related cases is limited to a single set 
of 7-year old demands. Moreover, the conflict among the CAs is 
more apparent than real because the CA7 has undermined its ini-
tial decision; when later confronted with the same issue, two 
members of the panel concurred only because they felt bound by 
the earlier decision. See United States v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 597 F.2d 672, 674 (CA7 1979) (Pell, J., concurring), 675 
::>. 
(Wood, J., concurring). The other three CAs that have ad-
dressed the issue have continued to reject the CA7 position. 
If the CA7 again were presented with the issue, it is likely it 
would realign itself with the other CAs. The access demands 
generating these decision were unique in that they all were 
motivated by a congressional inquiry. It is unlikely that any 
CA again ~ill face the issue. 
vf EG'S REPLY IN NO. 1273: Merck's argument that unique 
demands generated the CA split obscures the fact that the issue 
is one of statutory construction that could be implicated in 
any request for records issued by the Comptroller General. 
Merck's assertion of an "emerging consensus" rejecting the CA7 
position is at odds with the opinion below, in which the major-
ity of the CADC panel affirmed without engaging in any substan-
tive reasoning about the merits of the controversy. The one 
judge who did examine the issue Judge Mikva -- adhered to 
the CA7 position. 
DISCUSSION IN NO. 1273: There is an undisputed con-
flict on an issue that was sufficiently important to prompt a 
grant last year in Staats v. Bristol Laboratories, No. 80-264, 
451 u.s. 400 (1981). Merck's argument that the conflict is 
passing is belied by the split panel below. Its argument that 
the source of the conflict will never again occur seems specu-
lative. I would defer to the government's assertion that it 
will repeat this type of investigation in the future if permit-
ted to do so. 
6. 
MERCK'S CONTENTIONS IN NO. 81-1472: Merck opposes 
this Court's review of this case. If cert is granted, however, 
the Court should not confine its examination to the truncated 
issue presented by the government. Two closely related and 
preliminary issues must be considered for the Court to resolve 
the dispute presented by this case. 
First, cost records are not "directly pertinent" to 
the contracts involved in this case within the meaning of the 
access statutes. Unlike the situation in cases of cost-plus 
contracting, the government simply has no interests in Merck's 
costs that "directly pertain to" or "involve transactions re-
lating to" fixed price contracts. Resolution of this point in 
Merck's favor would preclude the need to reach the government's 
issue of whether indirect and unallocated costs are discover-
able. 
Second, the Comptroller's access demand here was made 
for a purpose not authorized by Congress. The government has 
explicitly disavowed suspicions that Merck has engaged in im-
proprieties and any interest in auditing Merck's contracts. 
The legislative history of these access statutes shows they 
were limited to these purposes. Consequently the Comptroller 
General has exceeded statutory authority by attempting to use 
the access laws for the purpose of conducting a research study 
on the economics of the entire pharmaceutical industry. Reso-
lution of this point in Merck's favor also would avoid the need 
to decide the question presented by the government's petition. 
SG 1 S CONTENTIONS IN NO. 81-1472: Last term the Court 
refused to consider these issues in connection with Staats v. 
Bristol Laboratories, 451 u.S.400 (1981). See Merck & Co. v. 
Staats, No. 80-416, 449 u.s. 1038 (1980) (denying cert before 
CA judgment); SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, No. 80-434, id. 
(same) • There is no greater reason to review them at this 
time. Cross-petr 1 s arguments are without merit and have been 
rejected by every CA that has considered them. 
DISCUSSION IN NO. 81-1472: Last term the Court denied 
cert before judgment on these issues. Failure to take this 
extraordinary action does not demonstrate that these issues 
should not be reviewed in the ordinary course. In fact, Court 
files suggest that, at Conference in Staats v. Bristol Labora-
tories, Justices Brennan, White, Powell, and Stevens found 
Merck 1 s "directly pertinent" argument (presented via Merck 1 s -amicus brief) to be highly relevant to resolution of the issue 
now urged by the SG. 
RECOMMENDATION: I recommend granting both petitions. 
There is a response. 
03/29/82 Wiley Opinion in petn in No. 81-1273 
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My Clerks DATE: Sept. 20, 1982 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-1273 Bowsher, Comptroller v. Merck & Co. 
81-1472 Merck v. Bowsher 
At least one of these cases - and possibly both -
present the same issue before us in Staats v. Bristol 
Laboratories, in which we affirmed 620 F.2d 17 (CA2} by an 
equally divided court, with Justice Stewart not 
participating. See 451 u.s. 400, decided in June 1981. 
This is an important case involving an issue with 
respect to the right of the government, where there has been 
a negotiated contract with a supplier, to examine records 
that in normal accounting parlance do not involve direct 
costs of the product. Several similar cases have been 
decided in suits by or against pharmaceutical companies. 
I believe this case is on the December argument 
list. Whichever clerk "draws it" could well start with my 
file on the Staats case in which a bench memo was written. 
Often such memos are extremely "bobtail" in the spring, and 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 81-1273 
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Bowsher, No. 81-1472 
Questions Presented 
(1) With respect to negotiated government contracts, does the 
Comptroller General's statutory and contractual access-to-records 
authority include access to records of costs that the contractor 
does not allocate but that are defrayed by the contractor from 
commingled general revenues that include the Government's payments 
under the contract? 
(2) Is the Comptroller's statutory and contractual access-to-
records authority limited exclusively to cost-based contracts? 
(3) Is the Comptroller's statutory and contractual access-to-
records authority defeated by a claim that review of government 





In 1973, Merck entered into 3 contracts with the Defense Supply 
Agency of the Department of Defense and 1 contract with the VA for 
the sale of pharmaceutical products to the Government. As required 
by statute, each contract contained an access-to-records provision 
granting the Comptroller access to "any directly pertinent" records 
"involving transactions related to this contract." See 10 u.s.c. 
§§2313(b); 41 u.s.c. §254(c). 
In 1971, Senator Nelson, chairman of a subcommittee 
investigating the pharmaceutical industry, learned of the access-to-
records provisions contained in certain government contracts and 
urged that the General Accounting Office (GAO) invoke the 
provisions: "I think that we ought to take a look at some of those 
costs." Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings on 
Present Status of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry Before 
the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small ___ 
Business, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 8020 (1971). One oC~enator Nelson' 
staff assistants, Ben Gordon, explicitly stated that specific cost 
and price data should be secured by individual company and product, 
and that "such data should be made public." Gordon demanded on 
behalf of Senator Nelson that the data be sought "through the courts 
if necessary" and "without strings attached so that the information 
as needed." Similarly, a staff assistant to Senator 
Kenned) , chairman of a Senate subcommittee on health, 
1nsisted that the "only way" the objectives of Senator Kennedy's 
subcommittee could be achieved was to "publicize specific price and 
cost data for individual products." 
J. 
GAO finally concluded that it had "no viable alternative than 
to press the companies for access to their cost data." Initially, 
however, GAO sought the voluntary participation of drug 
manufactuers. Its appeal was successful: Merck and five other 
manufacturers voluntarily participated in the 1st phase of a 
proposed 2-phase study. In April 1974, GAO issued a proposal for 
"Phase II," designed to "gather and develop the data necessary" to 
make a "presentation concerning salient economic and operational 
aspects of the industry." The study was to cove l R&D J 
manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and corporat \ overhead) GAO 
requested data relevant to all these aspects of the companies' 
business for the period between 1964 and 1973. 
Merck expressed reservations about giving GAO access to such 
cost and pricing data without adequate guarantees of 
confidentiality. The Comptroller was prepared to give such 
guarantees in the interests of completing the study. Between April 
and August of 1974, GAO representatives met with Senate staff to 
seek their consent to the assurances of confidentiality. GAO 
emphasized that it would obtain "far more data" from voluntary 
disclosure, obtained on the basis of guaranteed confidentiality, 
"than we could demand under our statutory authority." The staff 
members were unpersuaded and refused to sanction any assurances of ~ 
confidentiality. ~ ~ 
On August 26, 1974, abandoning the concept of a voluntary
study, the Comptroller issued formal demand letters, seeking access 
to the records of the companies that had participated in the Phase I 
study. This step was taken with the approval of Senator Nelson. 
.... 
GAO was under no legal obligation to accede to the Senator's 
~c 
~ 
demands, ~nds had ~t been made formally by their ~~ 
...________.... ~~~ ~ ~ /) 
respective subcommittees. GAO's sole reason for abandoning its -~---~ 
voluntary program and resorting to formal demands was the Senator's 
refusal to approve any assurances of confidentiality. 
GAO had no reason to believe that any had occurred 
) 
/PI 
!]}fi tyV in nection with the contracts, that any excess or unfair profits 
been made, or that any violation of the law or other 
irregularity had occurred. All of the contracts selected by GAO for 
demand letters were fixed-price procurements, with prices 
established not by actual negotiation, but by reference either to 
catalog prices for ordinary commercial items sold in significant 
quantities to the general public or to other evidence of a 
competitive price. 
Merck filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
Comptroller lacked the authority to require the production of the 
data demanded. The suit was one of several challenges to the 
Comptroller's authority to examine the records of pharmaceutical 
companies pursuant to the access-to-records provisions. The 
Government counterclaimed for declaratory and injunctive relief to 
compel Merck to comply with the Comptroller's demand. 
The~ rejected Merck's arguments that the Comptroller's 
request was based on the assertedly improper purpose of 
"conduct [ ing] an economic survey of the pharmaceutical industry" 
rather than the concededly proper purpose of ensur[ing] that the 
prices [the Government] pays are reasonable and appropriate" and 
that no cost records were subject to disclosure because "the 
J. 
contract prices were not cost based." With respect to the scope of 
access, however, the DC held that access should be limited to 
records of mfg and delivery costs in accordance with the DC's 
decision in Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 620 F.2d 17 (CA2 1980), aff'd by an equally 
divided court, 451 U.S. 400 (1981). On this ground, th~DC denied 
GAO access to all records of Merck's unallocated costs of reasearch 
and development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and 
administration. 
A divided panel of the~DC affirmed the DC's judgment. Judge 
Mikva dissente in part, concluding that "Congress intended to give 
the o~ptroller General exactly the sort of authority he seeks to 
exert here." He stated that "[t]he test of 'directly pertinent'"--
the term that defines the scope of the Comptroller General's access 
rights--is "whether [the] documents will assist the government to 
determine whether its negotiating practices sufficiently protect it 
from wasteful, fraudulent, or inefficient procurement practices." 
Summaries of the Parties' Contentions 
1. SG. In light of the language, legislative history, and 
evident purpose of the access-to-records provisions, the Comptroller 
must be allowed to examine all of the contractor's cost records that 
are necessary and appropriate to determine whether the price charged 
the government was "extravagan[t] ," "excessive," or "wasteful[]," 97 
Cong. Rec. 13,198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy). Applying this 
standard to the present case, it is clear that the Comptroller is 
entitled to access to resp's cost records pertaining to R&D, 
advertising and promotion, distribution and administration. The 
middle ground carved out by the CADC--permitting access to allocated 
costs but not to unallocated costs--is an unsupportable limitation 
on GAO's investigative authority that cannot be reconciled with the 
intent of Congress. 
The relevant provisions grant access to records of "all" 
negotiated contracts, see 41 U.S.C. 254{c), and includes fixed-price 
negotiated contracts. Merck's contention to the contrary relies on 
a myopic view of the legislative history. The vast majority of the 
comments make clear that, although the prevention of fraud was one 
of the intended purposes of the provisions, other purposes--such as 
those underlying the present request--were equally a part of 
Congress' intent. 
Merck's final argument, that the Comptroller's request for 
records was motivated by an "improper" purpose, has been squarely 
rejected by every court that has considered it. The contention is 
premised on a misreading of the facts and a misconception of the 
study GAO proposes to conduct. In any event, the courts below found 
that GAO's purpose was proper and authorized by statute. 
2. Merck. GAO's sweeping demand for access to Merck's records 
conflicts with the express limiting language employed by Congress in 
granting the Comptroller General the right to examine certain books 
and records of government contractors. GAO may only demand access 
to records that {i) "directly pertain to" the contract and {ii) 
"involve transactions relating to the contract." The government's 
contention that GAO has the right to examine all "costs defrayed 
from commingled general revenues that include the government's 
, . 
payments under the contract" cannot be reconciled with the language 
of the access-to-records statutes. 
TheCA erred in upholding the DC's judgment permitting GAO 
access to records of Merck's direct production costs. Application 
of the words of limitation contained in the statute demonstrates 
that no cost records are "directly pertinent" to the non-cost-based, 
fixed-price contracts involved in this case. Merck's production 
costs were irrelevant to the formation or pricing of these 
contracts, because the contracts were negotiated on the basis of the 
catalog price at which Merck sold standard commercial items to the 
public or on the basis of other evidence of adequate price 
competition, rather than on the basis of cost data or estimates 
submitted to the purchasing agency. 
The CA also erred in permitting GAO access to any of Merck's 
records because the Comptroller's demand for access to Merck's 
records was not made for a congressionally authorized purpose. The 
record in this case establishes that the Comptroller issued his 
August 1974 access-to-records demands to Merck and five other 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in order to placate the desires of two 
Senators and their staff aides to secure confidential drug company 
cost data and to gather data for an economic study of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Congress did not authorize the Comptroller 
to demand access to records of private companies for either of these 
two purposes or for the pretext purpose of "assessing the adquacy of 
procurement techniques." 
I. 
A. Merck's Position. 
Discuss ion 
Improper Purpose 
A~ G- A- 0 _L-zs:1C.4 4 4 
~~ 
The issue G whether the GAO excee~ed 
its statutory authority by demanding access to confidential 
financial records, at the instance of two Senators and their staff 
aides, in order to furnish the Senators with individual company and 
product data through the conduct of an economic survey of the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
B. Assumptions Underlying the Argument. Merck's arguments are 
premised on the principle that an agency that is given power to 
investigate for one purpose cannot use that power to pursue 
distinctly different, unauthorized goals. See United States v. 
LaSalle National Bank, 437 u.s. 298, 307, 316-317 n.l8 (1978) (IRS 
subpoena power). It is an open question, however, whether the 
contractual powers of GAO, a unique independent agency within the 
legislative branch, should be subject to the same restraints as 
those on the subpoena powers of administrative agencies. See 
Cibinic & Lasken, The Comptroller General and Government Contracts, 
38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 349, 350 (1970) (GAO operates "on the hazy 
borderline between legislative and executive powers"). Cf. Case 
Comment, The Comptroller General's Authority to Examine the Private 
Business Records of Government Contractors: Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Staats, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1148, 1148 n.l (1979). 
C. Posture of Case. Merck argues that the record clearly 
demonstrates that GAO seeks access to its confidential business 
records to undertake an economic study of the pharmaceutical 
industry in response to intense and continuing pressure from two 
~-~kl~~ 
Senators and their staff aides who wish to o f~ - ~ 
disclosure, cost and pricing data~~~ specific products and 
~1 - L--1--~~. 
manufacturers. Because the Court -is r\ viewing the CA's affirmance 
of the DC's summary judgment, it must assume that Merck could prove 
that GAO is seeking to obtain information for an industrywide 
economic study that would provide Senators Nelson and Kennedy with 
the information they sought. 
D. Conclusion. The statutory requirement that the access-to-
records provision be included in the contracts establishes the 
public interest in uncovering wastefulness and extravagance. That 
U.S. senators encourage and influence GAO to use its powers to the 
fullest extent allowed by law, and that GAO heeds those senators, is 
irrelevant. See Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency -----Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 Yale L.J. 1360, 1368 {1980), 
quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 {1972) {noting 
that "members of Congress 'are constantly in touch with the 
Executive Branch of Government--they may cajole, and exhort with 
respect to the administration of a federal statute"). A demand 
letter issued by GAO pursuant to its statutory authority, under the 
continuing and intense pressure of U.S. senators, may not be 
resisted on the ground that GAO sought the information for an 
improper purpose. See City of Chicago v. United States, 396 u.s. 
162, 165 {1969) {"Whether the Commission should make an 
investigation ..• is of course within its discretion, a matter which 
is not reviewable."). 
I' • 
II. Cost-Based Contracts 
A. Merck's Position. Merck argues that cost data cannot be 
"directly pertinent" to "transactions related to this contract" 
where the price is fixed not in reference to a standard of fairness 
in negotiating or to costs, but to catalog, market, or competitive _ ........... 
prices. In support of this interpretation of §2313(b) and §254(c), 
, -
Merck points to limitations in the Truth-in-Negotiations Act, 10 
u.s.c. §2306(f), and in the Renogotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C. 
App. §1216(e), on the submission of cost data for the negotiation or 
renegotiation of contracts based on established catalog prices or 
adequate price competition. Merck argues that these statutes and 
the regulations promulgated thereunder provide important evidence 
that similar restrictions are incorporated in §2313(b) and §254(c) 
through the language limiting access to material "directly 
pertinent" to "transactions relating to" the contract. Merck 
contends that, in the absence of convincing evidence that different 
interpretations were intended, interrelated statutory provisions 
should be given a harmonious construction. 
B. Rejection of Merck's Arguments. Both the statutory and the 
J <.. ...... ~... 
contractual provisions clearly apply by their terms to negotiated 
contracts without qualification. If Congress had desired to exclude 
fixed-price contracts from the provisions' operation, it could have 
explicitly done so, as it did in the Truth-in-Negotiations Act and 
in the Renegotiation Act. Moreover, Merck's contention that the 
access-to-records provisions do not extend to costs conflicts wit~-,.-~ 
the language of the provisions. Not only has Merck contracted to~------~ 
disclose some "directly pertinent" records in its possession, but it 
.l..l.o 
has also contracted to put a provision in its subcontracts securing 
access for GAO to the "directly pertinent" records of its 
subcontractors. If the position urged by Merck--that the statute 
and the contract do not allow access to any cost records of fixed-
price contracts--is correct, the provision for access to the records 
of Merck and of its subcontractors would be a nullity. The purpose 
of the access-to-records provision is to allow GAO to assess the 
reasonableness of the contractors' costs and pricing by insuring 
full access by the Comptroller to all directly pertinent cost and 
pricing records, including subcontractors' records that otherwise 
might be unreachable because they would not be in the custody and 
control of the contractor. Thus, Merck's reading ignores a large 
portion of the provision itself and violates the well-established 
rule that a contract and a statute should be read so as to give 
meaning to all their provisions. 
L\ 
C. Conclusion. Cost records can be directly pertinent to 
fixed-price contracts. 
-----------------~ 
A. Problem. Rep. Har u d the following examples to 
_A 
illustrate the situations that his bill, which proposed the access-
to-records provisions, was designed to reach: 
It is common practice today to provide in a contract for 
construction work a fixed overhead rate, either as a 
proportion of direct labor costs or as a lump sum 
amount .... 
If in the course of checking the accounts of the 
accountable officer, the GAO found a situation indicating 
that the amount of overhead charged under the Government 
contract was a great deal higher than the amount paid 
under a private contract for the same work, it would then 
obviously be desirable for the General Accounting Office 
to look behind the rate which had been established .... 
During the last war, there were cases where 
contractors held both fixed-price and cost-plus-a-fixed-
fee contracts covering similar items or services, both 
contracts being performed simultaneously and in the same 
plant. In several cases it was found that the contractor 
was charging to the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract 
expenses which should have been charged to the fixed-price 
contract. In that way he was being reimbursed for 
expenses which should have been paid out of his own 
pocket. Such a practice may, or may not, have been 
intentional. But in any event, there would be little or 
no chance of detecting such a practice, unless the General 
Accounting Office has access to the contractors' books and 
records. 
97 Cong. Rec. 13,198 (1951). For GAO to detect a differential 
allocation of overhead costs between governmental and 
nongovern~s,~ between cost-plus and fixed-price 
contracts, it would have to examine a very broad set of rec~rds. -- --
........ 
See Case Comment, supra, at 1157-1158 n.67. The implication of Rep. 
Hardy's examples is that the legislation was i ntended to authorize 
inquiry, not only into all costs associated with each negotiated 
government procurement contract, but also into all similar contracts 
between a particular contractor and his private buyers, in order to 
determine whether the Government was bearing an excessive share of 
the company's fixed costs. It is clear, however, that Congress did 
not intend the "directly pertinent" language to allow GAO to examine 
records of costs recovered exclusively from nongovernmental 
contracts. See Memorandum on the Adequacy of the Legal Authority of 
the General Accounting Office to Conduct a Comprehensive Study of 
Profitability in Defense Contracting, reprinted at 115 Cong. Rec. 
25,800 (1969) (GAO has taken the position "that the words 'directly 
pertinent' were intended only to limit GAO's right of access to 
records pertaining to Government work as distinguished from non-
government work"). 
B. Legislative History. The bill that contained §2313(b} and 
§254(c} originally limited the Comptroller to "pertinent" records of 
the contractor. Rep. Hoffman emphasized in debates over the access-
to-records provisions that he objected strongly to "snooping 
expeditions" and that the access-to-records provisions would allow 
GAO "unlimited authority to go everywhere and snoop into everybody's 
business." 97 Cong. Rec. 13,373 (1951} (also stating opposition to 
a statute that "would let GAO go into everybody's business and look 
it over"}. To prevent an expansive interpretation of the 
provisions, Congress restricted the access proposal even further, by 
specifying that only records "directly" pertinent to the contract 
may be demanded. Rep. Hoffman, who sponsored the limiting amendment 
but opposed the original bill, see 97 Cong. Rec. 13,377 (1951}, 
stated specifically that the purpose of the modifying language was 
to "limit the 'snooping' that may be carried on under this bill." 
Id. Rep. Hoffman emphasized that, unless the proposed bill was 
limited, even a small government contract would open all of a 
contractor's records to GAO inspection. He pointed out that, 
without amendment, the provisions would permit a contract for 10% of 
a contractor's production to be inspected by GAO "not only with 
reference to that one item of 10 percent ... but into all of his other 
business where that same item was used." Id. He feared this result 
because the contractor would inevitably fail to keep "a separate set 
of books" for his government business, so that "every section of his 
books will have to come under the complete scrutiny of the GAO. He 
is going to be harassed no end to try to break down production costs 
and show the details ..•• " Id., at 13,376 (remarks of Rep. Harvey). 
Although these statements were offered in support of a proposed 
amendment relating to subcontractors, it is likely that the same 
apprehension stimulated the introduction and adoption of the 
"directly pertinent" language. 
... "t. 
C. Government's Position. The Government argues that 
Congress' addition of the word "directly" did not sharply narrow the 
scope of inquiry to be allowed GAO. See Case Comment, supra, at 
1157-1158. But see Note, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats: An Undue 
Expansion of the GAO's Investigatory Power Under the Access-to-
Records Statutes, 74 Nw. U.L. Rev. 122, 135 (1979). It is true that 
Rep. Hardy did not oppose the amendment. See 97 Cong. Rec. 13,377 
(1951). It is also true that Rep. Hoffman did not indicate how his 
change would affect GAO's ability to secure specific documents. See 
id. On the other hand, a sponsor's statement of purpose generally 
is regarded as a persuasive indicator of congressional intent. See 
FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976). 
The legislative history manifests a strong congressional intent 
to prevent unlimited "snooping." When Congress enacts a statute 
designed to limit governemnt intrusion in the private affairs of its 
citizens, the statutory provisions should be followed scrupulously. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the contracts here did not provide 
for unlimited access to Merck's cost records. 
D. Cost Allocation in the Pharmaceutical Industry. When cost 
information is not allocated to specific contracts and their 
products, the Government's argument that generalized cost data are 
"directly pertinent" to any given contract is weakened. See Note, 
supra, at 132. As do most manufacturing businesses, Merck divides 
its costs into a small category of direct manufacturing costs that 
can be readily assigned to a particular product and into other 
categories of cost, including reasearch and development, 
distribution, marketing, advertising, and administrative costs, 
which are not assigned to any one product. See Reekie, Price and 
Quality Competition in the United States Drug Industry, 26 J. Indus. 
Econ. 223, 235 (1978): Note, supra, at 132-133. Cf. National 
Association of Cost Accountants, Research Series No. 29, Accounting 
for Reasearch and Development Costs, 36 N.A.C.A. Bull. 1375 1427-
1430 (1955) (survey finding that some businesses assign R&D costs to 
particular products, but some do not because the arbitrary method of 
allocation would not be helpful). Merck maintains that this common 
practice reflects the lack of generally accepted accounting 
principles that permit accurate and meaningful allocation of these 
indirect costs. 
Obviously, however, these unassigned costs affect the price 
charged for the company's products, because the company must recover 
both the costs directly assigned and the unassigned pooled costs. 
Mfg and distribution costs of individual pharmaceutical products may 
constitute as little as 9% of the products' sale price. See Rucker, 
Public Policy Considerations in the Pricing of Prescription Drugs in 
the United States, 4 Int'l J. Health Services 171, 173 (1974). By 
characterizing unallocated costs as "directly pertinent" to 
government procurement contracts, GAO would be able to demand access 
to all records of pooled costs whenever the price charged the 
Government in the contracts at issue reflects costs attributable to 
the pool. GAO would thus have access to most, if not all, of 
Merck's pricing data. 
~u. 
The Government, on the other hand, rejects both the argument 
that there are no generally accepted accounting principles that 
permit meaningful allocation of these indirect costs and Merck's 
suggestion that GAO's interpretation of the access provision would 
be without limits. The Government argues that Merck itself 
allocates costs to products and performs profitability studies for 
its own purposes~ even if allocation of indirect costs to products 
cannot be made with scientific accuracy, it is helpful and 
necessary. The Government contends that there is almost no limit to 
the allocation of costs to particular products other than that set 
by expediency. The Government maintains, however, that it will not 
need certain information or information breakdowns, and thus that 
its request for information is not without bounds. In short, the 
Government's contention is that any cost affecting the prices 
charged the Government under a given contract may be "directly 
pretinent" to the contract. 
The Government's argument undermines its own position, for it 
would seem that the Government's interpretation of "directly 
pertinent" admits of no doctrinal limitation on its access powers." 
The Government has not suggested a definition of "directly 
pertinent" that preserves the distinction between snooping and 
properly limited access. Indeed, its argument gives the phrase no 
effect in this case. If a "directly pertinent" cost record means 
any cost having a significant input into price, it would seem that 
GAO could also justify an extensive investigation of subcontractors 
.1.. I o 
who may actually be doing no Government business at all. Cf. 
Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to 
Regain Parity of Power with the President, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1279, 
1364-1365 (1973) ("The same argument that would justify a GAO audit 
[similar to that requested here] would justify an audit of 
contractors doing no government business at all."). 
F. GAO's Interpretation. The Government contends that GAO's 
administrative interpretation of "directly pertinent" should be 
followed in the absence of compelling indications that it is wrong, 
especially where those interpretations were reported to Congress. 
Congress's inaction should not, however, be read as acquiescence. 
See Girouard v. United States, 328 u.s. 61, 69 (1946). GAO's broad 
interpretation of the provisions is inconsistent with the 
congressional intent and is entitled to no deference. Cf. Note, 
supra, at 135 n.77 ("The GAO itself has been uncertain about the 
exact limits of its authority under the access-to-records 
statutes."). It is therefore necessary to find a more limited 
interpretation consistent with the congressional history. 
G. Relevance of Other Industries. In some industries, costs 
such as R&D have such a small impact that they arguably are not 
"directly pertinent" to the contract and its price. Whether a cost 
record is "directly pertinent" could vary from industry to industry. 
In some industries, direct costs are the predominant component of a 
product's price, and there would be no need to grant access to 
indirect cost information of those firms. But in the pharmaceutical 
industry, R&D and other costs not immediatedly attributable to one 
product form a large part of the costs of a pharmaceutical product. 
~u. 
Each case could be decided on its facts by addressing one question: 
whether the records sought will show production costs and pricing of 
the contracts sufficient to determine why the contract price was 
fixed as it was and whether the contract may have been an 
inappropriate means of meeting this particular procurement need of 
the Government. The judicial decision as to what records are 
necessary would thus be essentially an accounting problem that is 
not unlike those problems that are common in day-to-day discovery 
involving corporations. 
Congress probably did not intend for the interpretation of the 
access-to-records provision to depend on the facts of each case. 
The same provision appears in most Government contracts. See Nash, 
Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 693, 
694 n.3 (1966) (finding that only one quarter of all Government 
procurement contracts are advertised (bidded, not fixed-price) 
contracts). Congress probably intended the words to acquire some 
common meaning so that the Government and the contracting firm could 
know within reason what they were contracting to perform. In 
contracts involving many millions of dollars, many firms, and many 
products, certainty is more important than deciding each case on its 
facts. 
The Bristol DC equated the directly pertinent costs with 
"manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging materials, labor 
and fringe benefits, quality control and supervision); manufacturing 
overhead (including plant administration, production planning, 
warehousing, utilities, and security); royalty expenses; and 
delivery costs." 428 F. Supp., at 1389. Specifically excluded, 
however, were data with respect to "research and development, 
marketing and promotion, distribution and administration (except to 
the extent that these areas may be included in the factors above)." 
Id., at 1389-1390. The CADC has adopted the standard formulated in 
Bristol, which for the most part relies on the distinction between 
direct and indirect costs. It probably comports most closely with 
Congress's intent to preclude GAO's scrutiny of nongovernmental 
contracts. 
H. Problems with the Bristol Distinction. Although disputes 
the fact, it must be conceded that GAO may demand access to detect 
wastefulness and may make certain studies to help it in its task. 
Bristol's limiting interpretation of the access-to-records provision 
may make it more difficult in some cases for GAO to obtain the 
information it may need to uncover wastefulness. In industries 
where direct costs are the prime component of price, where firms are 
producers of only one product, or where the firms sell almost 
everything they make to the Government, Bristol will have little 
limiting effect on GAO's ability to make various studies. With 
other firms, mfg cost information alone might be useful for two 
purposes: (1) it might help to uncover fraud~ and (2) where the 
products are part of a competitive market, which most fixed-price 
cost contracts, by definition, a comparison of direct cost 
information could help the Government determine which company is 
assigning more overhead to its product. Nevertheless, it must be 
acknowledged that Bristol will limit to varying degrees GAO's 
ability to study any industry with firms that make several products 
or have several buyers. Moreover, economic studies based on such 
I...Vo 
restricted data may be of limited utility, and if the access 
provisions were meant to equalize the relationship between the 
Government and private contractors, Bristol fails to advance fully 
that purpose in this case. 
The difficulty, however, arises because {1) the statute 
attempts to further the two conflicting congressional goals of 
'---------------------limiting "snooping" and permitting broad access; and {2) the 
1... ,..-
pharmaceutical industry presents special characteristics. The 
conflict in goals appears on the face of the statute itself. For 
example, the fact that the demand is limited by the access-to-
records provisions to data within three years of final payment, see 
10 U.S.C. §2313{b), no doubt hampers the detection of wastefulness 
and the usefulness of any studies that are prepared. Congress also 
restricted GAO's investigatory powers by not making the access-to-
records provisions applicable to advertised as well as negotiable 
contracts. Information on producers doing no business with the 
Government would undoubtedly also be useful in the overall 
improvement of Government procurements, because the data could be 
compared with the data collected from companies contracting with the 
Government; but GAO cannot obtain that information under the 
provisions. See Morgan, supra, at 1364-1365. The Court is not free 
to ignore these limitations in trying to assure that GAO has 
meaningful access to the contractor's records. 
I. Conclusion. GAO has itself recognized its dilemma: "While 
GAO's legal authority would permit it to perform some of the work 
necessary in making a profit study ..• , to do a meaningful study of 
profitability .•• , legislation should be enacted broadening its right 
of access to records ..•. " GAO Memorandum, supra, reprinted in 115 
Cong. Rec. 25,801 (1969). "In establishing the 'directly pertinent' 
standard as a limitation on the GAO's access rights, Congress 
apparently was willing to forego obtaining all the information that 
might be related to a government contract if the only alternative 
was to require a contractor to make available virtually all of its 
records." Note, supra, at 134-135 (footnote omitted). If "directly 
pertinent" information is not sufficient to make the Comptroller's 
investigation of certain industries complete, or if certain 
industries should be treated differently because of unique 
circumstances, Congress, and not this Court, is better able to 
decide which information GAO needs to fulfill Congress' 
expectations. 
Summary 
1. Merck must allow GAO personnel to inspect its records with 
respect to manufacturing costs, manufacturing overhead, royalty 
expenses, and delivery costs. Merck need not produce data with 
respect to R&D, marketing and promotion, distribution and 
administration, except to the extent that these costs may be 
included in the manufacturing costs. 
2. The Comptroller's statutory and contractual access-to-
records authority applies to fixed-cost contracts. 
3. The Comptroller's statutory and contractual access-to-
records authority may not be defeated by Merck's allegation that 
review of government procurement methods is an unauthorized purpose 
for exercising such authority. 
4. Affirm. 
81-1273 BOWSHER V. MERCK & CO. 


















~ 1e;7:z. ~ ~cr~, ~~ 
)'tu_ ~·~~~~AU? ~-~3.,~ 
... p~~ Jlo~ C/~J4J 
~~~~h~ ~ , 
~ ¢~ c,~-~ t::ZZ:i.-~ 
~ ~~ -o/JA'<~~u, . 










~ ·-~~~~ ~-1- .. .J-.. ~ 
~  Lo ~~ ~ ~4--e.-L~ 
~;v. ~~ ~ - FJ. 74:,4._., 
~~--~~~~~~ 
~ ~M-~ 
w-T~ ~ ~ ~-~ 1 ~/--z,o ~~ 
~~~~~~~ 
of J4; ,.,~ ~el-f~ 
~ . ~ 1' pyf-~ ~ - ~~t!k~c.'j 





~ ~ 19-{~J..~ ~Z.7= --~ a. '9 I! C#) Tft.1e t< 'S C Z.. ~ 1 '3~)~ 
~It(. s . ~. zs-~(~)- p ~ ~ ;?~ k~ 
p~ ~~~ 
q v-vl--~ ~ tv{ . 
1-ruv ~1; ~~~ ~~-,, 
~ ''~~_J~~ ~\' ----.-~~~ -




~~ ~ ~ ~,.....-~~....,. ~ 
I< )c' 'X' 
~~~~~~~~ 
~s~~~'f~-~ 
~h::i:t . 7Z .tde ... ~ ~ ~,~/--~ -
~. 
&/-f- {) ~ ~~--zh;f ~&,~ 
~1.-o 7N ~ 







< . ; 
81-1273 
No. 81-1472 
The Chief Justice 




~ L-£..c... 3" I- I 'tl7 ~ 
~~--~~~~~-
Justice Brennan 
Justice White ~ - g' J- J z 7 > 
~· SI-IL/-7z_ 
r 
Justice Marshall ajf · I z 7 3 ~ J {? 72-(--.., ~') 
r .1-...- ;},., L,~ ~ t -- -'"'' ---- 7  c .,._ # 
Justice Blackmun ~ ~ I ·z: 7 "S' /2.z.t.r I '-I 7 z 
Justice Powell ~ ~ l 'Z 7 s )'9,_;,~  /ic;;,;; ...,._ /¢72: <(>? 
~~~~-L-~ •. 
J ~1- ~.tt:-- .. a ~ 





Justice Rehnquist 2:2.f.AJ. ~ /:;"'/ "T J 2_ 7 "3 ~dZi<j ~ "" I 9' 7 <... 
Justice Stevens t::J.ft I.A..A- ; 2 I 2. 7 3 ~ ~ ~ 
W H-/( ,..._ ,L,s, &Lf-1--~ ~ I ¢-7 2- .. 
Justice O'Connor ~ I 2 7 3 
) 
To: The Chief Justice 
{j) Z hzfiA- '1 d:fs- z 





~ tJ A _ /J ._ Justice Powell 
'...Y ~" ~ - ~ Justice Rehnquist 
1fJ ;>  ~J:JL /j JJ.llll,j,.,tevens 
{j) ?:!£ /J tA.-~ -k> P1 From: Justice O'Connor 
~~~~~~~, CiJjculated: , I r 1~0..) 
~.n::f.r 7 ~y. -I /f--. I{;. 
/' Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 81-1273 AND 81-1472 
CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
81-1273 v. 
MERCK & CO., INC. 
MERCK & CO. , INC., PETITIONER 
81-1472 v. 
CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
UNITED STATES 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue before the Court is the scope of the authority of 
the Comptroller General of the United States to examine the 
records of a private contractor with whom the Government 
has entered into fixed-price 1 negotiated contracts. We 
'A pure fixed-price contract requires the contractor to furnish the goods 
or services for a fixed amount of compensation regardless of the costs of 
performance, thereby placing the risk of incurring unforeseen costs of per-
formance on the contractor rather than the Government. See 1 R. Nash 
f\ ~ ~ f'4o..u:> andJ. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law 413 (3d ed. 1977). Variations on 
"::.\' '--\ the pure fixed-price contract may contain some formula or technique for 
5~ 
~ 
)_p, '5" CJ I c_ 
~2-/2-f 
cb ~. ·,o·I.J'('u adjusting the contract price to account for unforeseen cost elements. See 
- ili: ~---, q~ · ~3-4tMd;~:'.:• :lt ~t::oa~n~~~i a1;!, ( ro . ~ ~) 
~,, ~~ ~ ~~-\~72. ~c_~ ~ ~\()cw!:,~ 
~r~ ~rot o!: ~; ~ ~~ C.\.~ ~ ~ 8\-W~~ .. , 
~ -tM (\""' ~ ~ ~· ~I UJl- ~~ """\ ~.~ 
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conclude that, when the terms and conditions of the contract 
are not expressly tied to the contractor's costs and the con-
tractor makes no representations regarding its costs during 
the course of negotiations, none of the contractor's cost 
records is subject to inspection by the Comptroller Genelil. --- I 
In 1973 Merck & Co., Inc. ("Merck") entered into three 
contracts with the Defense Supply Agency of the Depart-
ment of Defense and one contract with the Veterans Admin-
istration for the sale of pharmaceutical products to the Gov-
ernment. All four contracts 'X_ere negotiated, rather than 
awarded after formal advertising. 2 "'t'he'"' pharmaceutical 
products supplied under each contract were standard com-
mercial products sold by Merck in substantial quantffi"es to 
thegeneral public. App. 41a. The price term proposed by 
Merck for each contract was based on the catalog price at 
which Merck sold the item to the general public or was other-
wise determined by adequate competition. Before the 
award of each of the contracts at the fixed-price proposed by 
Merck, there was no actual negotiation of rice. The gov-
ernment contracting officers id not request Merck to submit 
cost data in connection with any of the four contracts. In 
short, the contract price wa§ nQ.t rel.~d to Merck's costs of 
R[OductiQ.D. or performance under the contract, and Merck 
rna~ during negotiations regardiiigifs 
costs. 
fixed-price incentive con , · redetenninable contract). 
2 The Government ploys two methods of procurement: advertised 
procurement, i. e., fo a! solicitation of petitive bids, and procure-
ment by negotiation. · on ract is the method authorized by 
statute for use in situations in which the fonnal advertising and bidding 
procedure is deemed impractical or unnecessary. See 10 U. S. C. 
§ 2304(a); 41 U. S. C. § 252(c). In procuring by negotiation, the govern-
ment agency discusses the tenns of the procurement with one or more con-
tractors and awards the contract to the party offering the tenns most 
advantageous to the Government. 
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As required by 10 U.S. C. §2313(b) and 41 U.S. C. 
§ 254(c),a each contract contained a standard access-to-
records clause granting the Comptroller General the right to 
examine any directly pertinent records involving transac-
tions related to the contract. Relying on these clauses, in 
August 1974 the Comptroller General issued a formal demand 
to Merck for access to the following: 
"all books, documents, papers, and other records di-
rectly pertinent to the contracts, which include, but are 
not limited to (1) records of experienced costs of direct 
materials, direct labor, overhead, and other pertinent 
corporate costs, (2) support for prices charged to the 
Government, and (3) such other information as may be 
necessary for use to review the reasonableness of the 
contract prices and the adequacy of the protection af-
forded the Government's interests." App. 18a. 4 
3 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b), which applies to the Defense Supply Agency 
contracts, provides; 
"Except as provided in subsection (c), each contract negotiated under 
this chapter shall provide that the Comptroller General and his represent-
atives are entitled, until the expiration of three years after final payment, 
to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of the contractor, or 
any of his subcontractors, ~ectly pertain to and involve transactions 
relating to, the contract or subcontract." • 
The Veterans Administration contract is governed by 41 U. S. C. § 254(c), 
which provides in pertinent part: 
"All contracts negotiated without advertising shall include a clause to the 
effect that the Comptrorrer General of the United States ... shall until the 
expiration of three years after final payment have access to and the right to 
examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of 
the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of 
and involving transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts." 
Despite the slight difference in wording, there is no substantive difference 
between the defense and civilian procurement statutes. 
'The Comptroller General issued identical demands to five other 
pharmaceutical companies. These access-to-records demands apparently 
were the product of congressional interest in competition and profits in the 
pharmaceutical industry generally. 
81-1273 & 81-1472-0PINION 
4 BOWSHER v. MERCK & .CO. 
Merck refused to comply with the Comptroller General's re-
quest and commenced this action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the Comptroller General's access demand 
exceeded his statutory authority. 5 The United States inter-
As early as 1971, Senator Gaylord Nelson suggested during hearings on 
competition in the drug industry that the Comptroller General invoke his 
access-to-records authority "to take a look" at the costs incurred by 
pharmaceutical companies. Hearings on Competitive Problems in the 
Drug Industry Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select 
Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8020 (1971). Follow-
ing those hearings, Senator Nelson's staff continued to urge the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) to use the access provisions to obtain cost records 
"without any strings attached so that the high profits could be publicized 
by product and firm." App. 144a; id., at 142a-148a. See also Hearings, 
supra, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 8537, 8581-8583 (1972). 
Finally in June 1973, the GAO responded by proposing a two-phase 
study of the economics of the pharmaceutical industry to be accomplished 
through voluntary participation by drug companies. Merck and five other 
companies agreed to cooperate in the first phase, which contemplated gath-
ering background data on the industry. In April1974, the GAO issued a 
proposal for the second phase of the study, aimed at developing data on 
"salient economic and operational aspects of the industry." App. 141a. 
Merck expressed its concern over participating in this phase without ade-
quate assurance of the confidentiality of the cost data it might be requested 
to supply. 
Initially the GAO agreed that the data regarding individual companies 
and individual drug products should remain confidential and anonymous. 
/d., at 150a. Senators Nelson and Kennedy and their staffs, however, re-
iterated that the subcommittee's objectives could be served only by publi-
cation of the data. Ibid. The Comptroller General's formal demand let-
ters to the six companies that had participated voluntarily in the Phase I 
study followed. 
5 Four of the remaining five pharmaceutical companies that received 
demand letters also challenged the Comptroller General's request. See 
SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, Nos. 
81-2082, 81-2268; Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v. 
Staats, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980) (per curiam), affd by an equally divided 
Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981); United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 
F. 2d 672 (CA71979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904 (CA7), cert. 
denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978). 
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vened and counterclaimed to enforce the Comptroller Gener-
al's demand. 
The Distr~t Court granted ~rtial su~ jud_gment for ./).L 
each party. ReJecting MerCk~ argument that cost records 
are not "directly pertinent" to the fixed-price contracts that 
were the predicate of the GAO demand, the court permitted 
access to all records 
"directly pertaining to the pricing and cost of producing 
items furnished by . . . Merck under the . . . contracts 
... , including manufacturing costs (including raw and 
packaging materials, labor and fringe benefits, quality 
control and supervision), manufacturing overhead (in-
cluding plant administration, production planning, 
warehousing, utilities and security), royalty expenses, 
and delivery costs." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 
81-1273, p. 39a. 
The court barred access, however, to records "with respect) 
to research and development, marketing and promotion, dis-
tribution, and administration." I d., at 40a. In a brief per 
curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the ( A -'I~ ..: 
1 District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 665 F. 2d 1236 (1981). /..\ !J C c.A'J'V ~
Both parties sought certiorari. In No. 81-1273, the 
United States petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals' 
determination that records of Merck's indirect costs are not 
subject to examination by the Comptroller General. In No. 
81-1472, Merck challenges the determination that records of 
its direct costs are "directly pertinent" to the contracts in 
question and are therefore subject to examination. We 
granted certiorari on the petitions of both parties. 
U. S. -- (1982). We now affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
II 
In resolving the issues of statutory construction presented 
by the parties, 6 we "'must begin with the language of the 
6 The parties agree that the scope of the Comptroller General's author-
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statute itself."' Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC, 
455 U. S. 577, -- (1982), quoting Dawson Chemical Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 187 (1980). Congress 
chose t'!o significant ..Ehrases of limit~n to describe the 
class of recoras to which access is permitted under 10 
S.C. §2313(b) and 41 U.S. C. §254(c); the records must 
directly pertain to the contract and (2) involve transac-
~s relating to the contract. These descriptive phrases 
employ "WOrds of relation-i. e., they refer to and derive 
meaning from the particular factual circumstances surround-
ing the contract at issue. Thus, the nature of the contract 7 
serves as a significant limitation on the Comptroller General's 
access authority. Moreover, the pl:!!ase "directly pertinent" 
limits that authority by requiring a close c·onnecbon between 
the type of records sought and the nature of the underlying 
contract. 
The egislative history o e access provisions underscores 
what the e ects: the intention of Congress to limit 
to some degree the Comptroller General's access powers. 
As originally introduced, the bill now codified as 10 U. S. C. 
§ 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c) provided access to "perti-
nent" records "involving transactions related to" the con-
tract. See 97 Cong. Rec. 13371 (1951). 7 Representative 
ity under the access-to-records clauses in the four contracts turns on the 
meaning of the statutory language, rather than on the intention of the par-
ties to the contract. We also emphasize at the outset that Merck does not 
challenge the authority of Congress to impose, as a condition of doing busi-
ness with the Government, a requirement that contractors disclose all of 
their cost records to the Comptroller General, regardless of the pertinence 
of these records to the particular contract. Rather, Merck bases its argu-
ments on its interpretation of the statutory language. 
7 This bill was modeled on, and as originally proposed was identical to, a 
January 1951 amendment to the First War Powers Act of 1941. See Act 
of January 12, 1951, 64 Stat. 1257. That amendment, a piece of emer-
gency legislation adopted in response to the crisis conditions created by the 
Korean War, was designed explicitly to detect fraudulent or other im-
proper conduct. Because of severe wartime inflation, many defense con-
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Hoffman opposed the original bill on the ground that it per-
mitted "unnecessary snooping expeditions" and allowed the 
GAO to "go into everybody's business and look it over if they 
just wanted to take a look at it." I d., at 13373. He there-
fore offered a floor amendment to insert the word "directly" 
before the word "pertinent," stating that the purpose of the 
amendment "is to limit the 'snooping' that may be carried on 
under this bill." I d., at 13377. The sponsor of the original 
bill, Representative Hardy, did not oppose the amendment, 
and the amendment passed without debate or discussion. 
The passage of the Hoffman amendment clearly reveals 
that Congress did not wa.!_lt .!J.@"e_;;tricted "sn9.2£ing" by the 
Comptroller General into the business records of a private 
contractor. The Government nevertheless attempts to dis-
count the significance of Congress' addition of the word "di-
rectly." Based on the lack of opposition to the limiting 
amendment by the bill's sponsor and the lack of debate, the 
tractors holding fixed-priced contracts could not meet their obligations. 
To alleviate the problem, Congress gave President Truman emergency au-
thority to renegotiate government contracts. See H. R. Rep. No. 3227, 
81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1950). The access-to-records provisions were 
included in order to deter fraud and profiteering in the renegotiation proc-
ess. 96 Cong. Rec. 17123 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("The amend-
ment will give power to the General Accounting Office to go into the books 
and delve into the records of these contractors who have been relieved to 
determine whether or not there is fraud or overreaching or whether they 
have done anything untoward."). 
Although the initial access-to-records legislation in the January 1951 
amendments was of limited duration, Congress shortly thereafter passed 
the permanent version at issue here. Representative Hardy, the sponsor 
of both the temporary and permanent access-to-records provisions, learned 
that government procurement officers were negotiating contract modifica-
tions under two permanent procurement statutes that lacked access provi-
sions, the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Prop-
erty and Administrative Services Act of 1949. "In order to plug this 
loophole," Representative Hardy introduced the bill to require inclusion of 
access-to-records clauses in contracts negotiated under these statutes. 97 
Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy). 
• .• t
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Government argues that the Hoffman modification did not 
significantly alter the scope of the Hardy bill. We cannot 
agree. The only explanation in the legislative history of the 
meaning and purpose of the amendment is that of Represent-
ative Hoffman. His statement, which, as the explanation of 
the sponsor of the language, is an "authoritative guide to the 
statute's construction," North Haven Board of Education v. 
Bell, 456 U. S. 512, -- (1982), expressly indicates that the 
intent of the amendment was to curtail the scope of investiga-
tion authorized under the bill. Although, as the Government 
emphasizes, Representative Hoffman did not have the votes 
to defeat the bill, he nevertheless had the votes to circum-
scribe the inquiry that the Comptroller General was autho-
rized to undertake. Moreover, to accept the Government's 
contention that the amendment had no substantive effect 
would contradict the settled principle of statutory construc-
tion that we must give effect, if possible, to every word of the 
statute. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De 
La Cuesta, 458 U.S.--,-- (1982). 
In sum, the c~anguage of the statute and the legisla-
tivelirstory of that language provide two guideposts for de-
termining whether the class of recoras sought by ~mp­
troller General fall within his statutory authority.~, we 
must be guided by the congressional concern for rotecting 
the privac~riv~te contractors from broa -r~~ov­
ernmental intrusionrnto their business affairs. ~he 
language chosen by Congress to safeguard that privacy inter-
est directs our attention to the terms and conditions of the 
particular contract and instructs us to ensure that the re-
quested records have a close connection to that contract. 
With these principles in mind, we turn to th~c cont~­
tions of the p_ru:ties. 
,.._____-- '-.! III 
The Government contends that the Court of Appeals erred 
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in holding that records of Merck's indirect costs 8 are not "di-
rectly pertinent" to the contracts in question. It offers three 
principal reasons for concluding that such cost records di-
rectly pertain to the four fixed-price contracts at issue. We 
address each in turn. 
A 
First, the Government maintains that Merck's indirect 
~ ~e d~ec~~t1Ln.JIDt to-the fixed-price contracts be-
cause Mere uses payments made by the Government under 
these contracts to defray indirect expenses. Thus, the Gov-
ernment would have us define as "directly pertinent" the 
records of any costs defrayed from commingled general reve-
nues that include government payments under the contract. 
Under that definition, records of expenditures to purchase j 
raw materials for the manufacture of an entirely different 
product than that sold under the government contract or to 
invest in the stock of another corporation would be subject to 
inspection by the Comptroller General. 
This interpretation contravenes both of the interpretive 
principles identified. First, the Government's interpreta-
tion would permit far-ranging governmental scrutiny of a 
contractor's business records of nongovernmental transac-
tions completely unrels:tted to either the contract underlying 
the access demand or~ the product procured under that con-
tract. Indeed, carried to its logical extreme, the argument 
would dictate that few, if an of a rivate contractor's busi-
ness records would be immune from GAO scrutmy, thereby 
violating tile congressional concern for protecting the privacy 
of the contractor's business records. In addition, the Gov-
ernment's argument focuses not on the nature of the particu-
lar government contract to determine whether any costs 
8 By indirect costs we mean costs incurred in the areas of research and 
development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration, 
which are not directly attributable to a particular product. 
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records are relevant to that contract, but on the fact that the 
Government's transactions with the contractor contribute to 
the financial support for the contractor's entire enterprise. 
B 
Second, focusing on the Comptroller General's overall stat-
utory respons1 1 1 1e , e overnmen argues at recor s of 
a ~ct costs are "necessary and appropriate 
to determine whether the price charged the government 
was" extravagant, excessive, or wasteful. Brief for Peti-
tioners in No. 81-1273, p. 33. 9 Under 31 U. S. C. § 53(a), 
Congress charged the Comptroller General with the respon-
sibility to "investigate ... all matters relating to the receipt, 
disbursement, and application of public funds" and to "make 
recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in 
public expenditures." See also 31 U. S. C. §§ 60, 65(a). Ac-
cording to the Government, the legislative history of the ac-
cess statutes reveals that Congress regarded the access au-
thority granted therein as one of the tools by which the 
Comptroller General was to fulfill his statutory mission under 
31 U. S. C. § 53(a). 10 The Government argues that, in an in-
dustry in which indirect costs represent such a large propor-
tion of total costs, 11 access to records of those costs is critical 
to an understanding of the industry with which the Govern-
9 We observe, however, that the Government has conceded in this ac-
tion that it has no reason to suspect that Merck has engaged in any fraud or 
impropriety in connection with the negotiation or performance of these 
contracts. App. 41a-44a, 76a. Nor does the Government have any rea-
son to believe that the prices charged under these contracts were unrea-
sonable in any way. Id., at 42a, 76a. In fact, the price under each of the 
contracts was the lowest price at which Merck sold each of the products to 
anyone at the time the contracts were awarded. Id., at 26a, 42a. 
10 Representative Hardy explained that the two major purposes of the 
bill were "to give the Comptroller General the tools to do the job the Con-
gress has instructed him to do ... and ... to provide a deterrent to impro-
prieties and wastefulness in the negotiation of contracts." 97 Cong. Rec. 
13198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy). 
11 The Government suggests that direct costs may represent as little as 
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ment is dealing and to an assessment of the fairness of the 
contract price and the advisability of continued adherence to 
the negotiated procurement methods employed under these 
contracts. In short, the Government contends that denying 
access to indirect cost records would impede the GAO in its 
mission to improve the procurement process generally. 
The Government's a eal to oli ar ments favoring 
broad access is mdee emptmg. Were our function to act as 
policymakers, we might well be swayed, for the taxpayer's 
interest in receiving the maximum protection against impru-
dent or unwise government procurement methods is strong. 
Nevertheless, policymaking is not our task. We are con-
strained to interpret t e c o ces ongress has already made, 
as revealed by the language and legislative history of the ac-
cess-to-records statutes. 
Turning to the language, we find that, as an explanation of 
why indirect cost records "directly pertain to" and "involve 
transactions related to" the four fixed-price contracts here, 
the Government's argument must fail. Reduced to its essen-
tials, the argu~ ny cost records that are di-
rectly pertinent to the C omptro er enera s general over-
sight responsibilities for the procurement process are within 
the scope of a proper inquiry by the Comptroller General. 
So phrased, it becomes clear that this second argument is 
also inconsistent with the limiting language of the statute and 
the policy behind that language. By adding the "directly" 
pertinent limitation, Congress clearly dia notWrsfi to grant 
the Comptronef Genera~and all records 
tha m e e p 1 o e m mg 1 s general stat- l 
utory responsibilities. The language reads directly perti- 1..1fl'-t-
nent "to the contract," and not directly pertinent to the r 
GAO's oversight responsibilities. 
Further, the legislative history reveals that Congress did 
9% of the sales price of a pharmaceutical product. Brief for Petitioners in 
No. 81-1273, p. 34. 
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not view the statutes as a new, independent directive to the 
GAO to act as a roving commission to ferret out waste, ex-
travagance, and inefficiency by inspecting whatever records 
might reveal these problems. The Government concedes 
that Congress' primary concern or purpose in enacting the 
access provisions was to equip the GAO to detect fraud and 
improprieties. Brief for Respondents in No. 81-1472, p. 11. 
To suggest that another principal purpose of the statutes 
was to equip the GAO to detect waste, extravagance, and in-
efficiency wherever they might find them is inconsistent with 
the repeated representations that the bill's principal purpose 
was limited. Representative Hardy: st~ed: "The sole pur-
pose of the bill is to enaore-trie 'Comptroller General to make 
effective audits along the lines and under the jurisdiction 
conferred upon the General Accounting Office by law. This 
is merely to give him the tools with which to work." 97 
Gong. Rec. 12611 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy) (emphasis 
added). He~ ~ned: "This bill would at least en-
able the agent o ongress to check~, both 
from ~rds and tne contractors' books." 
ld., at 13198 (emphasis added). 12 
Of course, Representative Hardy recognized that the 
12 As the following monologue by congressman Hardy also reveals, he 
viewed the bill as giving the GAO the ability to check the records of a 
transaction between the contractor and the Government during the audit 
process in order to detect the kind of fraud or impropriety that would per-
mit the GAO to disallow improper or illegal payments. He further ex-
pected that knowledge of GAO's ability to oversee the transaction would 
deter any improprieties during negotiations. 
"[T]he audit which GAO performs is directed primarily to the accounts of 
the accountable officers of the Government and not to the contractors 
themselves. The GAO is required by law to take exceptions against ac-
countable officers for erroneous or illegal payments. 
" ... [M]y main purpose in offering this bill was to place on the statute 
books a law which will act as a deterrent to improprieties in the negotiation 
of Government contracts. 
"In conclusion, I repeat that this bill does not add to the present audit 
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GAO's review of records directly pertinent to the particular 
transaction might disclose "a lot of other situations besides 
those involving fraud." Id., at 13199. Indeed, discovery of 
other weaknesses in the procurement process-short of those 
that might prompt the GAO to disallow payments-would 
naturally be expected to occur through review of directly 
pertinent data. Nowhere did Representative Hardy sug-
gest, however, that the Comptroller General's access to a 
contractor's records was designed to enable the GAO to in-
spect whatever records the GAO might find helpful to uncov-
ering waste, extravagance, or inefficiency. 
In sum, it appears that the sponsor regarded the bill pri-
marily as a tool for protecting the Government from being de-
frauded in the articular tr sa tion, and thought that the 
access authority wou d ave incidental value in allowing the 
GAO to detect other weaknesses in the procurement proc-
ess.13 Therefore, while we do not deny that the statutes may 
be useful to the GAO in accomplishing its broader goals, it is 
not clear that these broader purposes motivated the legisla-
tion and should therefore be a definitive guide to interpreta-
tion of the meaning of "directly pertinent." These broader 
potential benefits of GAO inspection cannot license us to ig-
nore the express limitations contained in the statute. 
We are also convinced that the express congressional pur-
authority of the General Accounting Office .... 
"The major purposes of this bill are twofold: One, to give the Comptrol-
ler General the proper tools to do the [audit] job the Congress has in-
structed him to do; and, two, to provide a deterrent to improprieties and 
wastefulness in the negotiation of contracts." I d., at 13197-13198 (empha-
sis added). 
The thrust of all these assurances is that the access provisions would serve 
as an adjunct to the GAO's audit powers and would make such audits more 
effective. 
13 Cf. 97 Cong. Rec. 13377 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy) ("[W]e are not 
anticipating that the General Accounting Office could possibly go into all 
these things, but they would have the right to do it if they had any reason 
to suspect fraud or bad faith or illegality.") (emphasis added). 
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pose, conceded by the Government, of equipping the GAO to 
detect fraud and improprieties with respect to specific con-
tracts, will be served by our reading of the limiting language. 
Representative Hardy set forth a number of specific prob-
lems or "typical situations in which the authority of this bill 
would play an effective part." Id., at 13198. Our holding I 
that indirect cost records are not subject to review under a 
pure fixed-price contract will not impede use of the access 
provisions to ctlret:lmse specific problems. For example, 
Representative Hardy expressed concern over the practice of 
a contractor, awarded both fixed-price and cost-plus govern-
ment contracts, of submitting as claims for reimbursement 
under the cost-plus contract expenses actually incurred in the 
performance of the fixed-price contract. There can be no 
doubt that records of costs, both direct and indirect, are di-
rectly pertinent to a contract when the price paid by the Gov-
ernment is expressly based on the costs of perlormance. 
The GAO therefore would have broad access to a contractor's 
records under the cost-plus contract and thereby could detect 
this expense-shifting activity. 
Another example given by Representative Hardy was the 
misrepresentation by a construction contractor of his over-
head costs, which are "supposed to be based upon the experi-
ence of the contractor in performing similar work in the 
past." Ibid. Again, however, where representations re-
garding costs are made during the negotiation process, 
records of those costs become directly pertinent to and in-
volve transactions relating to the contract. Here Merck 
made no representations and was not questioned about its 
costs during the negotiations. Nor was Merck requested to 
provide cost data. 
In a third example, Representative Hardy referred to the 
representations about costs made in support of a price re-
determination request under a price redeterminable con-
tract. He felt that the prospect of GAO review of these cost 
records would provide an incentive to government officers to 
•. 
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perform their redetermination functions more carefully. 
This example, like the others, reflects problems that arise 
from misrepresentations regarding costs during negotiations 
or that are otherwise connected with cost-based contracts. 
Obviously, our reading of the statute will have no effect on 
the usefulness of the access provisions in these areas. 
Finally, Representative Hardy referred to the problem of 
the Government's relative disadvantage at the negotiating 
table. The Government seizes upon this reference to argue, 
in essence, that any records that might improve the Govern-
ment's negotiating position for the future should be accessible 
to the Comptroller General. We have already noted, supra, 
at --, that this general theory is inconsistent with the lan-
guage of the statute, which directs us to ascertain the direct 
pertinence of records to the specific contract and not to the 
GAO's general oversight responsibilities. Moreover, Repre-
sentative Hardy apparently did not view the access statutes 
as a panacea for any lack of governmental negotiating exper-
tise. He commented: "This bill would at least enable the 
agent of Congress to check the transaction, both from the 
Government records and the contractors' books." 97 Gong. 
Rec. 13198 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy) (emphasis 
added). 14 
14 In connection with this concern for sharpening the Government's nego-
tiating skills, it is significant to note that the type of negotiated contracts 
involved in this action has been exempted from required review of cost 
data under related procurement statutes. The Renegotiation Act, 50 
U. S. C. App. §§ 1211 et seq., which established a Renegotiation Board 
commissioned to eliminate excessive profits on defense contracts, ex-
pressly exempts from the required submission of cost and profit informa-
tion to the Board government contracts involving "standard commercial ar-
ticles." 50 U. S. C. § 1216(e)(1)(A). This exemption reflects Congress' 
presumption "that the prices which prevail on the open market place are 
fair prices, and do not involve excessive profits." 99 Cong. Rec. 10272 
(1953) (remarks of Sen. Milliken). 
Similarly, the Truth in Negotiations Act exempts from its requirement 
that contractors submit cost and pricing data during negotiations contracts 
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c 
Nor are we persuaded by the Government's argument that 
the GAO's consistent and longstanding interpretation of its 
authority under the access-to-records statutes supports the 
view that all cost records are subject to examination under a 
fixed-price contract of the type in question here. Even if the 
GAO's interpretation could be so characterized, that inter-
pretation would not be entitled to deference, for, as we have 
noted above, the broad interpretation urged here is inconsis-
negotiated on the basis of the established catalog price for a standard com-
mercial item or on the basis of other indicia of adequate price competition. 
10 U. S. C. § 2306(f). The 1968 amendments to the Truth in Negotiations 
Act, Pub. L. 90-512, 82 Stat. 863, which extended to the government pur-
chasing agency a right of access to the contractor's books and records for 
purposes of conducting post-performance audits, also exempted non-cost-
based contracts. Hearings on the 1968 legislation established that the 
amendments were designed to grant the purchasing agency "the same type 
of access to records that the Congress has now made available to the Gen-
eral Accounting Office." Hearings on the Review of Defense Procurement 
Policies, Procedures, and Practices Before the Subcommittee for Special 
Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 61 (1967) (testimony of John Malloy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense). 
To the extent Congress was concerned during its consideration of the ac-
cess provisions in 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c) with im-
proving the Government's strength at the negotiating table, that concern is 
more directly addressed by the Truth in Negotiations Act. Requiring 
submission of the contractors' most accurate, complete, and current cost 
and pricing information during the negotiations would seem the most di-
rect way to safeguard the Government against the "sharp practices" of ne-
gotiators for the private contractor. Notwithstanding its recognition that 
r negotiated contracts require close supervision and control because of the 
~sence of competitive market forces in setting the price, Congress ex-
press! exem ted the kind of contracts involved in this action. Although, 
un er norma princip es of statutory cons ruction, this related legislation 
does not control our interpretation of the access provisions, Congress' ap-
parent judgment that these contracts pose no particular danger to the Gov-
ernment certainly makes it more difficult to contend that Congress in 1951 
would have viewed cost records as "directly pertinent" to a fixed-price 
contract. 
·. 
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tent with the statutory language. See Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 411 (1979). 
Moreover, it is clear that the GAO's current sweeping in-
terpretation of its access power directly conflicts with its con-
temporaneous interpretation of the legislation when Con-
gress was considering the bill in 1951. 15 In letters to the 
chairmen of the relevant House and Senate committees, the 
Acting Comptroller General identified only one purpose of 
the bill: "[T]he proposed legislation is intended as a deterrent 
to those persons who might otherwise abuse the authority to 
~otiate., certain contracts without advertising." H. R. 
Rep. No. 791, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1951); S. Rep. No. 603, 
82d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1951). Moreover, in his 1951 annual 
report to Congress, the Comptroller General expressed his 
view that the access-to-records statutes were designed "to 
strengthen General Accounting Office auditing and to make it 
more effective" by serving as a deterrent "in preventing 
fraud in Government contracts." Annual Report of the 
Comptroller General of the United States for the Fiscal Year 
Er;ded June 30, 1951, at 67 (1951). 
/In contrast to this more limited, contemporaneous inter-
pretation of its authority by the GAO, the Government cites 
nothing contemporaneous that directly supports its view that 
all cost records under a fixed-price contract are subject to 
GAO inspection. The only directly supportive statements 
by the GAO occur in testimony before a congressional sub-
committee in 1963 regarding its litigation of the scope of its 
access authority in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 
(1968). 16 In light of the GAO's litigation posture during these 
16 An agency's contemporaneous construction of a statute under which it 
operates " 'carries more weight' " when the agency's views are "'directly 
made known ... to Congress in committee hearings.'" SEC v. Sloan, 436 
U. S. 103, 120 (1978), quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 192 (1969). 
16 Hewlett-Packard, like this case, involved a request by the Comptroller 
General to review cost records of a contractor who entered into fixed-price 
negotiated contracts. During that litigation, a congressional subcommit-
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hearings, this testimony cannot provide persuasive evidence 
of the GAO's consistent interpretation or practice. 17 
Indeed, other evidence of GAO's post-enactment interpre-
tation and use of its access authority undercuts the Govern-
ment's contention. In his 1955 annual report to Congress, 
the Comptroller General explained that the GAO's use of its 
access authority has focused primarily on audits of cost-based 
tee commenced hearings to investigate "the need for, or desirability of, 
recommending legislative action" in light of Hewlett-Packard's refusal to 
permit inspection of its cost records under the access provisions. Hear-
ings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before the Sub-
committee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed 
Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). During the course of these hear-
ings, Robert Keller, General Counsel of the GAO, testified concerning the 
GAO's position with respect to the Hewlett-Packard situation. 
"It is our position that the contract clause and the statute give us the 
right to examine the cost records of the contractor and other pertinent data 
that relates [sic] to items included in the contract, in sufficient complete-
ness and detail to permit us to determine the reasonableness of the negoti-
ated prices." Id., at 10. 
Mr. Keller further stated that the GAO could "go beyond direct manufac-
turing costs" into such areas as "how research costs are allocated as be-
tween the Government contract and commercial business." Id., at 23. 
In legislative hearings in 1965, which in part addressed "the extent of the 
GAO's right to examine contractor books and records," Hearings on Comp-
troller General Reports to Congress on Audits of Defense Contracts Before 
the Subcommittee on Military Operations of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965), the Comptroller Gen-
eral again referred to his position in the Hewlett-Packard case, which was 
still pending in the courts, regarding the proper interpretation of the ac-
cess provisions. Id., at 45. 
17 Later, in the hearings that provided the impetus for the eventual issu-
ance of an access demand letter to Merck, the Assistant General Counsel of _I\ . .A • 
the GAO testified that the access provisions would permit the GAO "to ex- ~cva ~ ~ 
amine records of costs, direct and indirect, generated in the performance of look. tO.GIIl ~ 
[a negotiated] contract." Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug 
Industry Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee 
on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8018 (1971). Although the Gov-
ernment relies upon this 1971 testimony for the proposition that direct and 
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contracts: 
"The examination of contract activities is concerned 
primarily with the operation and administration of those 
types of negotiated contracts under which the Govern-
ment has a financial interest in the costs of performance. 
They usually are cost-reimbursement-type contracts and 
the various forms of price redetermination or incentive 
contracts under which the ultimate price is materially af-
fected by costs of performance." Annual Report of the 
Comptroller General of the United States for the Fiscal 
Year Ending June 30, 1955, at 22 (1955). 18 
Further, for the years 1974 and 1975, the only years for 
which there is record evidence, every neg_otiated_contract au-
dited by the GAO under its access authority was a cost-based 
ccmtract negotiated on the basis of~ost estimatetsupport~ 
by cost or pricing data. App. 22a-23a, Lfl>a. And, in a rul-
ing of particular significance for the facts of this case, the 
Comptroller General determined in 1967 that the access pro-
visions do not confer upon the GAO the right to examine 
records relating to a contractor's nongovernmental business, 
even when such review is necessary to determine whether a 
catalog-priced item was actually sold in substantial quantities 
to the general public. App. 162a-163a. 
Finally, memoranda of the GAO reveal its view of the lim-
ited scope of its access authority. In late 1969, the GAO pre-
indirect cost records are accessible, as here, in the case of a pure fixed-
price contract, that testimony does not specify whether reference is made 
to fixed-price, as well as cost-based, negotiated contracts. 
18 Even the 1956 annual report, upon which the Government relies, em-
phasizes the GAO's focus on cost-based negotiated contracts. "[Negoti-
ated] contracts are negotiated largely on the basis of actual or estimated 
cost and it is, therefore, essential that the contract prices be carefully ana-
lyzed and evaluated." Annual Report of the Comptroller General of the 
United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1956, at 23 (1956) (em-
phasis added). 
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pared a memorandum for Congress in connection with con-
gressional consideration of a proposed grant of additional 
access authority to the GAO to pursue a study of contractor 
profits in the defense industry. In the memorandum, the 
GAO informed Congress that its authority under the 1951 ac-
cess provisions did not extend to review of records of a con-
tractor's nongovernmental business and that additional ac-
cess authority was therefore necessary to conduct a profit 
study. 115 Cong. Rec. 25800-25801 (1969) (reprinting GAO 
Memorandum on the Adequacy of the Legal Authority of the 
Comptroller General to Conduct a Comprehensive Study of 
Profitability in Defense Contracting). 19 A 1970 internal 
19 It is significant to note that the profit study of the defense industry, 
which Congress authorized as part of the Military Appropriations Act of 
1970, Pub. L. 91- 121, § 408, 83 Stat. 204, is the only occasion on which Con-
gress has deliberately granted the GAO the kind of broad-ranging author-
ity it asserts here. In conferring this authority, Congress, wary of equip-
ping the GAO to conduct a "fishing expedition," 115 Cong. Rec. 25795 
(1969) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff), carefully limited such authority to "only a 
single study." /d., at 25793 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). 
Although not conclusive with respect to interpretation of the 1951 access 
statutes, subsequent congressional rebuffs of GAO requests for expansion 
of its access authority are instructive both with regard to the GAO's view 
of the limits of the 1951 legislation and Congress' apparent reluctance to 
broaden that legislation. For example, a Senate bill introduced in 1973 
directed that "the Comptroller General ... shall . .. have access for the 
purpose of audit and examination to any books, documents, papers and 
records ... which in the opinion of . .. the Comptroller General may be 
related or pertinent to the ... contracts . .. [or] subcontracts." S. 2049, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (emphasis added). Another Senate bill which, 
like S. 2049 never emerged from committee, would have granted the 
Comptroller General authority to undertake a study of profits made on 
Government and commercial contracts by contractors having Government 
contracts aggregating $1 million or more. To enable the Comptroller Gen-
eral to make such studies, the bill gave him the authority to demand from 
the contractor "such information maintained in the normal course of busi-
ness . . . as the Comptroller General determines necessary or appropri-
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memorandum also reveals the GAO's belief that amendment 
of the 1951 access statutes would be necessary to give it the 
power to examine records of indirect costs and the power to 
inspect records considered "necessary to evaluate the effi-
ciency and economy of the contractors' operations," rather 
than only records pertinent to particular contracts. App. 
160a-161a. 
In sum, GAO's contemporaneous interpretation of the 
scope of its access power and the history of administrative 
practice under the statutes favor Merck's position in this 
action. 20 
To summarize, we have determined both that the Govern-
ment's intepretation of "directly pertinent" admits of no doc-
trinal limitation, rendering nugatory the lim~f 
t~nd that the GAO's current interpretation of the 
statute is not entitled to deference. Applying the interpre-
tive principles identified above, Part II, supra, we hold that 
when the terms of a pure fixed-price negotiated contract are 
not expressly tied to a contractor's indirect costs and the con-
ate." S. 3014, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See also S. 2268, 94th Cong. , 
1st Sess. (1975). 
20 The Government also argues that "directly pertinent" should not be 
defined to exclude Merck's indirect cost records simply because Merck has 
chosen not to allocate indirect costs to the individual products supplied 
under the contract. To the extent the Government attributes this position 
to Merck, it mischaracterizes Merck's argument. The pertinence of 
Merck's indirect costs to the contracts simply does not depend upon the in-
ternal accounting practices Merck has adopted. Rather, the nature of the 
contract and the circumstances under which it was negotiated determine 
whether access to these records is permissible under the statutes. There-
fore, as Merck contends, even if it had fully allocated all of its costs, 
records of those costs still would not directly pertain to a fixed-price con-
tract under which costs play no role in the negotiation, pricing, or perform-
ance. Conversely, cost records would be directly pertinent to a cost-based 
contract without regard to whether the costs were allocated or unallocated. 
81-1273 & 81-1472-0PINION 
22 BOWSHER v. MERCK &.CO. 
tractor makes no re resentations durin ne otiations re ard-
ing t ose costs, records of those costs do not "directly pertain 
to" or "involve transactions relating to the contract" and are 
therefore not subject to inspection by the Comptroller Gen-
eral under 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c). 
~he Government objects that such a holding creates an ex-
emption for fixed-price negotiated contracts that has no basis 
in the statutory language. We disagree. First, to conclude 
that fixed-price contracts are automatically exempt would be 
an unwarranted extension of our holding. There are variet-
ies of fixed-price contracts under which the price ultimately 
paid by the Government is, in accordance with the particular 
contract terms, influenced in some direct manner by costs. 21 
Moreover, even under a pure fixed-price, non-cost-based 
contract, the contractors' costs may nevertheless play a sub-
stantial role in the negotiations. For example, although the 
government contracting officer may ultimately accept the 
firm fixed-price proposed by the contractor, he may be per-
suaded to do so only after concluding, on the basis of the con-
tractor's representations regarding its costs or the relation-
ship of those costs to the proposed price, that the price term 
is fair and reasonable. Where such representations regard-
ing costs are part of an actual negotiation of the price, our 
holding would not preclude a finding that cost records are 
subject to examination even under a pure fixed-price negoti-
ated contract. 22 
21 See generally 1 R. Nash and J. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law 
414-415 (3d ed. 1977) (discussing fixed price contract with escalation 
clause, fixed price incentive contract, and fixed price redeterminable 
contract). 
22 With respect to fixed-price contracts in which the price, as here, is 
based on the catalog price or the price is otherwise based on adequate price 
competition, we note that the exemption from the required submission of 
cost and pricing data during negotiations is a permissive rather than a 
mandatory exemption. 10 U. S. C. § 2306(f) (requirements "need not be 
applied" to such defense procurement contracts); 41 CFR § 1-3.807-3(b) 
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IV 
We briefly address Merck's contention that even records of 
direct costs 23 are not within the class of records to wfiiCii tfie 
statutes permit access when the procurement contracts are of 
the nature involved here. Our agreement with Merck's posi-
tion must follow from the princ1p es we e se ort a ove. 
We repeat a e erms and conditions o tlie four contracts 
in question are not expressly based on, nor were they arrived 
at during the course of negotiations on the basis of represen-
tations about, Merck's costs-either direct or indirect. 
Under these circumstances, direct cost records do not di-
rectly pertain to or involve transactions relating to the con-
tracts in question. 
In Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v. 
Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388, 1391, affd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 
1980) (per curiam), affd by an equally divided Court, 451 
U. S. 400 (1981), the district court accepted, without analysis 
or discussion, the contractor's agreement to provide records 
relating to manufacturing costs as a "sensible point at which 
to draw the line." 24 Although the distinction between direct 
cost and indirect cost records, which was also adopted by the 
courts below, presents an attractive compromise, it is noth-
ing more than that: a compromise which is not the product of 
reasoned analysis. 25 If, as under the circumstances here, the 
(1981) (same with respect to such civilian procurement contracts). It \ ~·~ -\Q.;.. ~ \lldf\c,Qp 
therefore lies completely within the power of government contracting wJ- ~ of_. ~ 
agencies to ensure that cost records become directly pertinent to such con- ~'\\it'?  
tracts simp! by demanding that contractors submit cost and pricing data 0 
d~ ~egotiations . /1 _, y 
23 Tli~nclude direct manufacturing and overhead costs incurred ')'t..(YLl; 
in producing the specific drug items procured under the four contracts. 
24 Of course, our affirmance by an equally divided Court in Bristol is not 
entitled to precedential weight. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 192 
(1972). 
21> We observe that the decision in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968), permitting 
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terms and conditions of the contract are not expressly tied to 
the contractor's costs, and the contractor makes no represen-
tations during negotiations regarding those costs, records of 
those costs do not become any more directly pertinent to such 
a contract simply because they relate to direct costs rather 
than indirect costs. 
One might argue that direct costs "directly pertain" even 
to a contract in which the price is not expressly tied to costs 
because no rational businessman would establish even a cata-
log price without some assessment of the costs of perform-
ance and the margin of profit necessary to avoid a loss on the 
product. This argument, while appealing as an assumption 
about business realities, misses the relevant inquiry to which 
the language of the statute directs our attention. The stat-
ute does not grant access to all records that, from the con-
tractor's perspective, were directly pertinent to his decision 
in the negotiating process. Instead, the Comptroller Gen-
eral may examine only those records that the terms and con-
ditions of the contract, together with any representations 
made during the negotiations, reveal as directly pertinent to 
the transaction. 
v 
In our judgment, the only records directly pertinent to the 
four fixed-price, non-cost-based contracts in question here 
are those necessary to verify that Merck actually had an es-
access to direct cost records under a fixed-price contract, rested on what 
can only be described as a tortured construction of the term "contract." 
According to the court, the statutory term referred to the general subject 
matter of the contract-i. e., procurement of described property by the 
Government. ld., at 1016. However, the court's initial assessment of the 
statute and its application to the kind of contract in question here was more 
accurate; if the term "contract" refers to the terms and conditions of the 
specific agreement, then "data pertaining to costs could not be said to di-
rectly pertain to, and involve transactions relating to, a contract in which 
production costs were not taken into consideration in arriving at its terms 
and conditions." Ibid. 
z 
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tablished catalog price for the item procured, that it sold the 
item in substantial quantities to the general public at the cat-
alog price, that it delivered the product specified, and that it 
received from the Government no more than the amount due 
under the contract. 26 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is af-
firmed insofar as it denied access to Merck's indirect cost 
records and is reversed insofar as it permitted access to 
direct cost records. 
It is so ordered. 
26 In light of our disposition of the direct and indirect cost issues, we need 
not address Merck's additional argument that, because the records were 
sought for an improper purpose-i. e., for an industry-wide profit study, 
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The preliminary vote at conference in these cases was to 
adopt Merck's position and hold that the GAO is not entitled 
to access to any of Merck's cost records. Merck's theory has 
been emphatically rejected by every Court of Appeals that 
has considered it, 1 and, in my view, we should do likewise, 
' In addition to the opinion below in the present case, 665 F. 2d 1236 
(CADC 1981), see SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), 
cert. pending, No. 81-2082; United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F. 
2d 672 (CA7 1979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904 (CA7), cert. 
denied , 439 U. S. 959 (1978); and Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). Apparently 
recognizing the untenability of the argument advanced here by Merck, the 
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because the result Merck seeks can be achieved only by dis-
torting the statutory language and the legislative history. 
The statutory provisions at issue, 10 U. S.C. §2313(b) and 
41 U. S. C. § 254(c), clearly were intended to allow the GAO 
a reasonable degree of access to contractors' records needed 
to determine whether prices charged to the government were 
excessive. Hence, I could not agree with the Conference 
vote. This memorandum expresses my present view .. 
I 
In each of the four contracts involved here, the United 
States agreed to purchase certain pharmaceutical products 
from Merck at a fixed price. In each instance, Merck pro-
posed a contract price based on its catalog or "market" price, 
and the government contracting officer accepted the proposal 
without any "haggling" or other negotiation as to price. 
Each of the contracts contains the statutorily-mandated pro-
vision allowing the GAO the right to inspect Merck's books 
and records that are "directly pertinent" to the contract. 
The GAO now seeks to examine those Merck records that 
indicate the cost to Merck of the goods sold to the govern-
ment. The GAO deems such an examination necessary to 
carry out its statutory duty to "investigate ... all matters 
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of pub-
lic funds," and to "make recommendations looking to greater 
economy or efficiency in public expenditures." 31 U. S. C. 
§53( a). 
By inspecting Merck's cost records, the GAO hopes to be 
able to estimate whether the contract price paid by the gov-
pharmaceutical manufacturer in Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F. 
Supp. 1388 (SDNY 1977), aff'd, 620 F . 2d 17 (CA21980), aff'd by an equally 
divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981), did not even dispute that it was 
"obliged by the terms of the contracts to provide access to records of its 
manufacturing costs, records which relate to the pricing of the products de-
livered and records required to verify all data obtained during the course of 
the review." 428 F. Supp. , at 1389. 
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ernment was a fair one. The GAO has confirmed by experi-
ence the common-sense observation that the mere "fact that 
a product is listed in a manufacturer's catalog and offered to 
any customer is no assurance that . . . the standard catalog 
price is reasonable." 2 If the GAO's inspection were to re-
veal that Merck's prices were unreasonably high, the GAO 
presumably would recommend to the contracting agencies 
that they "negotiate prices more carefully or . . . obtain 
greater competition in future similar procurements,'' 3 or that 
they take other action "looking to greater economy or effi-
ciency," 31 U. 8. C. § 53(a), in future expenditures. 
Merck asserts, however, that, despite the inclusion of the 
access-to-records provision in the contracts, the GAO has no 
right to inspect its books to determine how much it cost 
Merck to produce the products sold to the government. This 
assertion is based on two related but independent premises: 
first, that a contractor's cost records cannot be "directly per-
tinent" to a fixed-price contract based on catalog prices, and, 
second, that the GAO can exercise its right of access only if it 
suspects that the contractor has engaged in fraud or other 
improper conduct. Neither of these propositions has the 
slightest degree of merit. 
II 
As we frequently iterate, we begin with the language of 
the statute. E. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Amalgam-
ated Transit Union, -- U. 8. -- (1982); Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington, 442 U. 8. 560, 568 (1979). The legislation 
at issue requires unadvertised government contracts to in-
clude a clause allowing the GAO to examine any of the con-
2 Hearings on the Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before 
the Subcomm. for Special Investigations of the House Comm. on Armed 
Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1963) (remarks of Robert Keller, Gen-
eral Counsel of the GAO). 
3 Joint App., at 23a (affidavit of Paul Dembling, General Counsel of the 
GAO). 
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tractor's books, documents, papers, or records "that directly 
pertain to, and involve transactions relating to, the contract. 
" 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b). See 41 U. S. C. § 254(c). 
Nothing in the statutory language excludes records pertain-
ing to fixed-price contracts (in general) or contracts based on 
catalog prices (in particular). Nor does anything in the stat-
utes suggest in any way that the GAO must suspect fraud or 
wrongdoing before it can exercise its right to examine the 
relevant books and records. Therefore, the GAO's claim of a 
right of access to Merck's cost records is valid unless the doc-
uments the GAO seeks to inspect are not "directly pertinent" 
to, or do not "involve transactions relating to," Merck's con-
tracts with the government. 
"'[l]t is hard to imagine anything more directly related to a 
contract than the cost of producing the items covered by it or 
the matters going into the makeup of the price.'" Eli Lilly 
& Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904, 913 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 
U. S. 959 (1978). Accord, SmithKlirie Corp. v. Staats, 668 
F. 2d 201, 208-209 (CA3 1981); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 
United States, 385 F. 2d 1013, 1016 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 
390 U. S. 988 (1968). Merck's argument to the contrary is 
based on the proposition that its production costs do not "di-
rectly pertain" to the contract "because they were irrelevant 
to the negotiation of the contract or to a determination that 
the contract was performed in accordance with its terms.'' 
Merck Br., at 40. The plain language of the access provi-
sion, however, entitles the GAO to records directly pertinent 
to the contract, which means all aspects of the contract; the 
statutory language does not in any way limit the GAO's ac-
cess to records directly pertinent to only the contract's nego-
tiation or performance. 
Merck cites no authority that supports its position. Its 
theory is based on the erroneous premise that if the contrac-
tor made no representations, and the government's negoti-
ator made no inquiries, as to the contractor's production 
costs, such costs must be considered to have been and to be 
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irrelevant to the government's decision to enter into the con-
tract. Obviously, however, in instances where the contrac-
tual price of an item was unduly higher than the amount it 
cost to produce the item, the government most likely would 
not have agreed to the contract had it known of this fact. 
Therefore, even looking at the statutory language alone, 
Merck's contention that its production costs are not directly 
pertinent to these contracts is untenable. 
III 
Even if, contrary to my belief, the statutory language is 
somehow regarded as ambiguous, resort to the legislative 
history further refutes Merck's position. The legislative his-
tory of the access-to-records provisions is relatively brief and 
to the point. It demonstrates without the slightest doubt 
that Congress intended to allow the GAO authority to exam-
ine a contractor's books to evaluate government procurement 
techniques by ascertaining whether the government had paid 
a reasonable price for the contractor's goods or services, even 
in instances where the GAO does not have reason to suspect 
that the contractor acted in an improper manner. 
Rep. Hardy, the bill's sponsor, began the debate by stating 
that his "main purpose" in proposing the legislation was to 
provide a "deterrent to improprieties in the negotiation of 
Government contracts." 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951). 
Merck takes these and other words out of context and comes 
to the patently erroneous conclusion that the only intended 
purpose of the bill was to deter improprieties such as fraud 
and abuse. To the contrary, Rep. Hardy clearly indicated 
that the bill was also intended to improve the adequacy of 
government procurement techniques in various other ways. 
He expressly stated: 
"The major purposes of this bill are twofold: One, to give 
the Comptroller General the proper tools to do the job 
the Congress has instructed him to do; and, two, to pro-
6 
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vide a deterrent to improprieties and wastefulness in the 
negotiation of contracts." I d., at 13198. 
Merck ignores the first of these two "major purposes." As 
noted above, Congress has instructed the GAO to "investi-
gate all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and 
application of public funds," and to "make recommendations 
looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expendi-
tures." 31 U. S. C. §53( a). 4 There is thus no warrant for 
Merck's conclusion that the access-to-records provisions were 
not intended to further the GAO's ability to perform these 
functions. 
Rep. Hardy early explained to his colleagues that normal 
procurement procedures called for competitive bidding but 
that procurement by negotiation was sometimes necessary. 
In the latter context, where there is no competitive bidding 
to "operate[] as a brake on the price which a contractor can 
demand from the Government," Rep. Hardy saw the need to 
establish "every reasonable safeguard against waste and ex-
travagance in the spending" of government funds. 97 Cong. 
Rec. 13198 (1951). He felt that, no matter how "conscien-
tious and honest" the government representatives might be, 
the contractor's representatives would, in the great majority 
of cases, have a tremendous advantage from the standpoint 
of both training and experience. Ibid. Thus, there was 
"every chance in the world that the Government [would] 
come out on the short end of the deal," and Rep. Hardy 
deemed it necessary to "at least enable the [GAO] to check 
the transaction, both from the Government records and the 
contractors' books." Ibid. 
Rep. Hardy then gave some factual examples of "typical 
' In addition, [t]he Comptroller General is authorized and directed to 
make an expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the 
Government ... which ... will enable Congress to determine whether 
public funds have been economically and efficiently administered and ex-
pended." 31 U. S. C. § 60. 
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situations in which the authority of this bill would play an 
effective part." Ibid. One such example was about a con-
tractor who charged the government a great deal higher rate 
of overhead than it did its private customers. Another ex-
ample involved a 
"situation where the Government was buying parts from 
an automobile dealer who, in turn, was getting them 
from a parts distributor who, in turn, was getting them 
from a small tool shop. Naturally, the price paid by the 
Government included profits upon profits and completely 
wasteful administrative and handling costs." Ibid. 
The sponsor observed that that it "would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for the GAO to detect such a situation without 
the right afforded" in the bill. Ibid. 
It is apparent from Rep. Hardy's remarks that the bill was 
intended to guard against more than fraud and abuse. Con-
tractors employing experienced, well-trained negotiators 
could not be accused of wrongdoing simply for 
"outnegotiating" their government counterparts. The auto-
mobile dealer who sold the parts to the government at retail 
was not acting fraudulently. Even the contractor who 
charged the government more than its private customers 
could not, without more, be accused of illegal or unethical 
conduct. Yet Rep. Hardy plainly intended that his bill apply 
in such situations. 
After Rep. Hardy finished his opening statement, he an-
swered a number of questions from other Members of the 
House. The following exchange ensued: 
"Mr. Mills: ... What the gentleman from Virginia 
and the committee, as I understand, are endeavoring to 
do, you are endeavoring to pursue a situation that may 
be fraudulent, for example, so that the General Account-
ing Office might look into that question. . . . 
Mr. Hardy: The gentleman is right, with this excep-
tion that I think should be clearly understood, that there 
8 
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are a lot of other situations besides those involving fraud 
which might be uncovered. 
Mr. Mills: The gentleman from Virginia did not hear 
me perhaps. I said an example would be fraud. 
Mr. Hardy: That is correct." Id., at 13199 (emphasis 
added). 
In light of this colloquy, Merck's claim that the statute was 
intended to have only a "limited anti-fraud purpose" borders 
on the frivolous. 
The debate continued two days later when Rep. Hardy 
proposed an amendment that would have allowed agency 
heads the discretion to omit the access-to-records clause from 
contracts with foreign contractors, id., at 13371, and Rep. 
Harvey proposed an amendment that would have exempted 
"a manufacturer or processor who is a supplier of material to 
a primary contractor and who is not a subcontractor" from 
the scope of the bill's coverage. I d., at 13376. Both of 
these proposals were ultimately defeated, but, during the 
lively debate on the proposed amendments, several Members 
of Congress stated without contradiction that the bill would 
allow the GAO extremely broad authority to examine 
records. For example, Rep. Harvey asked whether, if the 
bill became law, a subcontractor of a primary government 
contractor "would be subject to having all his books opened 
up for inspection by Government officials." Id., at 13372 
(emphasis added). Rep. Hardy replied that it would, unless 
the subcontractor only supplied some "casual item" in connec-
tion with the performance of the contract. Ibid. Based on 
this understanding, Rep. Harvey later argued that his limit-
ing amendment was needed, because otherwise "every manu-
facturer ... of ... goods that eventually find their way into 
defense production ... is going to have to supply all the an-
swers to the GAO on everything he manufactures." Id., at 
13376. "[E]very section of his books will have to come under 
the complete scrutiny of the GAO." Ibid. In response, 
'·· 
81-1273 AND 81-1472--MEMORANDUM 
BOWSHER v. MERCK & CO. 9 
Rep. Hardy did not dispute this characterization of the scope 
of the GAO's authority, but he nevertheless opposed the Har-
vey amendment, because it "would make it impossible fre-
quently to obtain information which would be vital in the 
study of a contract." Ibid. 
Rep. Hoffman, a strong opponent of the bill, several times 
during the debate observed that the "GAO under this bill can 
go into the books of [contractors] and ask and get from them 
anything and everything they want." I d., at 13373. He in-
dicated his belief that the bill would allow the GAO "to snoop 
into [a contractor's] books and find out what [the goods or 
services] cost[] or what will be a fair price or what profit we 
make." Ibid. See also id., at 13375, 13377. Standing 
alone, of course, the statements of an opponent of the bill, 
such as Rep. Hoffman, would not carry much weight, 5 but 
here, even though all comments pro and con were made in the 
midst of a free-wheeling debate, the proponent of the bill, 
Rep. Hardy, in no way took issue with Rep. Hoffman's view 
of the scope of GAO's authority. Rep. Hardy's essential re-
sponse was that it was necessary to require contractors to af-
ford the GAO this broad authority, and that Rep. Hoffman's 
fears of excessive GAO "snooping" were groundless, because 
the GAO would have neither the inclination nor the man-
power to examine the records of every individual supplier. 
Id., at 13376, 13377. 
The original Hardy bill required the inclusion, in negoti-
ated contracts, of a clause allowing the GAO the right to ex-
amine any records that were "pertinent" to the contract. At 
the very end of the debate, Rep. Hoffman proposed the 
amendment that added the word "directly" before the word 
"pertinent." I d., at 13377. Rep. Hoffman explained that he 
had discussed his amendment with Rep. Hardy, the bill's 
•see, e. g., National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 
U. S. 612, 639-640 (1967); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 
341 u. s. 384, 394 (1951). 
81-1273 AND 81-1472---MEMORANDUM 
10 BOWSHER v. MERCK & CO. 
sponsor, and that, although the amendment was "not all that 
it should be," it was the most that Rep. Hardy would agree 
to. Ibid. Rep. Hoffman then stated that the purpose of his 
amendment was "to limit the snooping that may be carried on 
under this bill which we do not have the votes to defeat." 
Ibid. At that point, Rep. Hardy remarked that he had no 
objection to the amendment, and it was accepted without fur-
ther discussion. Ibid. 6 
In light of Rep. Hardy's consistent position throughout the 
debate, it cannot plausibly be argued that he agreed to the 
Hoffman amendment with the understanding that it effected 
a drastic reduction in the scope of the bill's coverage or pur-
pose. As outlined above, Rep. Hardy continuously spoke of 
the need to provide a mechanism to combat waste and ex-
travagance in federal procurement, and he vigorously and 
successfully opposed the Harvey amendment, which would 
have significantly limited the bill's scope. His acceptance of 
the addition of the word "directly" appears to have been 
largely a sop to the bill's opponents. The most that can be 
said is that Rep. Hardy accepted the amendment to allay con-
cerns that the legislation "would let the GAO go into every-
body's business and look it over if they just wanted to take a 
look at it .... " Id., at 13373 (Rep. Hoffman). The amend-
ment gave assurance that the bill would not be used as a basis 
for inspection of books and records having no substantial con-
nection with government procurement. But the amendment 
definitely was not intended to bar the GAO's access to 
records legitimately needed to assess the reasonableness of 
prices charged to the government, and thereby to protect the 
government against waste, excessive prices, and ineffective 
procurement. 7 
6 Immediately after passage of the Hoffman amendment, the House 
passed the bill, as amended, 97 Cong. Rec. 13378 (1951. On the following 
day, the Senate passed it without any debate whatsoever. !d., at 13411. 
7 Accord, Merck & Co . v. Staats , 665 F. 2d 1236, 1249 (CADC 1981) 
(Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
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IV 
Although all courts have unequivocally rejected Merck's 
argument that the GAO may not inspect any cost records in 
situations such as the one here, the court below in the 
present case, and some other lower courts in similar cases,8 
have refused to uphold the GAO's claim of a right of access to 
all the cost records it wishes to examine, including some 
records that are undeniably essential to an accurate deter-
mination of whether the government wasted money by enter-
ing into these contracts. Applying the so-called "Bristol 
test,'' 9 these courts have limited the GAO's access to records 
pertaining to a contractor's 
"manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging ma-
terials, labor and fringe benefits, quality control and su-
pervision); manufacturing overhead (including plant ad-
ministration, production planning, warehousing, utilities 
Staats, 574 F. 2d 904, 916 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978); Com-
ment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1148, 1157-1158 (1979) ("[t]he court [in Eli Lilly] 
correctly rejected Lilly's argument that the insertion of the word 'directly' 
into the 'directly pertinent' formula sharply narrowed the scope of inquiry 
to be allowed the GAO"). 
In SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201, 210 (CA3 1981), cert. 
pending, No. 81-2082, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the Hoffman amendment "meant nothing." The 
court therefore adopted the standard formulated in Bristol Laboratories v. 
Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 (SDNY 1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980), 
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981), but it did so only 
because the government did not suggest any alternative definition of "di-
rectly pertinent" records that it wished the court to adopt if it did not agree 
with the government's reading of the statute. For an explanation of the 
Bristol standard, and my reasons for believing that the Bristol test is not 
entirely correct, see part IV, infra. 
8 See SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pend-
ing, No. 81-2082; Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 (SDNY 
1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451 
u. s. 400 (1981). 
9 The test was first adopted by the District Court in Bristol Labora-
tories v. Staats, supra. 
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and security); royalty expenses; and delivery costs." 10 
The Bristol test excludes: 
"data with respect to research and development, mar-
keting and promotion, distribution and administration 
(except to the extent that these areas may be included in 
the factors listed above). 11 • 
This test has been described, perhaps inaccurately, 12 as being 
based on a "direct costs v. indirect costs" or an "allocated 
costs v. unallocated costs" dichotomy. 
The courts that have adopted this test have no doubt been 
influenced by a perceived need to come up with some form of 
reasonable limitation on the broad access demand the GAO 
has made. The GAO claims it has the right to examine 
records pertaining to every cost "defrayed from commingled 
general revenues that include the government's payments 
under the contract." Although it is arguable that the GAO's 
demand is somewhat overbroad, I am not convinced that the 
proper conclusion is to limit the GAO to the cost records al-
lowable under the Bristol test. 
The Bristol court adopted its standard solely on the basis 
of the cost records that the contractor was willing to disclose 
to the GAO. The court felt that the contractor's offer "re-
flected a responsible and reasonable effort to distinguish 'di-
rectly pertinent' matter within the meaning of the access to 
records clause." 13 The court thus accepted the contractor's 
contention that the cost records it was not willing to disclose 
had "only the most general relation, if any, to the prices 
charged." 14 
10 428 F. Supp., at 1389. 
11 I d., at 1389--1390. 
12 The Bristol court itself stated that the costs records held examinable 
under its test are "by no means ... limit[ ed]" to direct costs. I d., at 1391. 
13 Ibid. 
1
' I d., at 1390. 
. . 
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Although cost records having, at most, only an insubstan-
tial relation to the price charged are not "directly pertinent" 
to the contract, it is apparent that many of the records 
deemed unexaminable under Bristol relate to costs that may 
have had a critical bearing on the prices charged, and that 
would be of central importance to a GAO inquiry into the fair-
ness of these prices. In the pharmaceutical industry, it has 
been estimated that "direct" or "allocated" costs comprise 
only about nine per cent of the sale price of individual prod-
ucts. The so-called "indirect" or "unallocated" costs-pri-
marily research and development, advertising and other pro-
motion, general administrative expenses, taxes, and profit-
are much larger and economically more significant. 15 Yet, 
under the Bristol test, the GAO is denied access to all 
records in this category, thus making it impossible for the 
GAO to make an accurate assessment of the fairness of the 
prices and thus the adequacy of the government's procure-
ment technique. 16 
In my view, the correct rule in a case of this nature is that 
any books or records that bear directly on the question 
whether the government paid a fair price for the goods or 
services it purchased are "directly pertinent" to the contract 
of purchase. In the present case, the GAO needs to make an 
16 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, supra, at 913; Merck & Co. v. Staats, supra, 
at 1247 (Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reekie, Price 
and Quality Competition in the United States Drug Industry, 26 J. Indus. 
Econ. 223, 235 (1978); Rucker, Public Policy Considerations in the Pricing 
of Prescription Drugs in the United States, 4 Int'l J. Health Services 171, 
173 (1974). 
16 For example, the Bristol test does not allow the GAO to examine a 
contractor's records of advertising costs. One would imagine that, if the 
GAO were aware that a great percentage of the cost of the products of a 
certain company went to support a large advertising campaign, rather 
than, say, to maintain quality control, the GAO might recommend to the 
contracting agency that it not deal with that company in the future. Yet, 
under the Bristol test, the GAO would not be able to obtain the information 
needed to make such a recommendation . 
l • 
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examination of at least some of Merck's "indirect" cost 
records in order to make an adequate evaluation of the fair-
ness of the contracts. The records of these costs therefore 
directly pertain to the contracts. 
v 
It does not necessarily follow from what has just been said 
that the GAO is entitled to all the information it claims it 
needs to determine the fairness of the prices Merck charged 
to the government. Although the GAO has a contractual 
and statutory right to examine Merck's books to the extent 
necessary to ascertain whether Merck's prices were exces-
sive, this right is not without limits. Where, as here, the 
GAO wishes to see a contractor's records and the contractor 
declines to accede voluntarily to a GAO request, the GAO 
must issue an administrative subpoena. If the contractor 
refuses to comply with the subpoena, the GAO must apply to 
a District Court for enforcement of the subpoena. 31 
U. S. C. §54( c) (Supp. V 1981). 17 
Once in the District Court, a contractor such as Merck has 
the benefit of all of this Court's jurisprudence limiting the 
bounds of an agency's right to demand the production of a pri-
vate entity's records. Essentially, in assessing an agency's 
application for enforcement of an administrative subpoena, 
we have insisted that the agency's demand be reasonable. 
The general rule is that "when an administrative agency sub-
poenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment 
17 The GAO has had this subpoena power only since 1980. See Pub. L. 
96-226 § 102(c), 94 Stat. 312 (Apr. 3, 1980) (codified as 31 U. S. C. § 54(c)). 
Prior to 1980, the GAO could only sue for specific performance of its con-
tractual right of access. See, e. g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). The GAO 
can still opt in favor of this latter, slower course, but the government does 
not make any claim that its rights in a specific performance action would be 
any different from those in an action for judicial enforcement of an adminis-
trative subpoena. See Oral Arg. Trans., at 29-30. 
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requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, 
relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compli-
ance will not be unduly burdensome." See v. City of Seattle, 
387 U. S. 541, 544 (1967). See United States v. Morton Salt 
Co., 338 U. S. 632, 652-653 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 208 (1946); 1 K. Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law Treatise § 4:15 (2d ed. 1978). This stand-
ard is a flexible one that takes into account the extent to 
which the public interest will be served if the subpoena is en-
forced. See v. City of Seattle, supra, at 545. 
Accordingly, I would remand these cases to the District 
Court, with instructions to uphold the GAO's request for ac-
cess to Merck's "direct" and "indirect" cost records, but only 
to the extent that the request is reasonable in scope and 
would not unduly burden Merck. Merck has presented evi-
dence that compliance with the GAO's demand would entail 
substantial expense and disruption of its operations. If the 
GAO's request is upheld in its entirety, an entire team of 
GAO auditors may remain on site at Merck for over two 
years. 18 This, of course, is a matter for first-instance deter-
mination by the District Court, but, if the proposed GAO in-
spection would in fact cause such a high degree of interfer-
ence with Merck's business, a credible argument could be 
made that compliance would be unreasonable and unduly bur-
densome and that the GAO's access should therefore be lim-
ited in some way. However, to the extent the GAO's de-
mand conforms to the dictates of See v. City of Seattle, Merck 
18 At the time the GAO issued its demand for access to Merck's records, 
it made identical demands to five other drug companies. Apparently, only 
one of the six companies, Hoffman LaRoche, Inc. (Hoffman), voluntarily 
acceded to GAO's request. According to Merck, a team of GAO auditors 
remained on site at Hoffman from July 1975 to July 1977 without complet-
ing the review, and, in July 1977, Hoffman terminated its voluntary par-
ticipation. Of course, even if Merck's claim as to the Hoffman precedent is 
accurate, Merck would have to prove that a GAO review of its records 
would require similar or greater disruption. 
....... 
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should be required to allow the GAO's examination to 
proceed. 
VI 
Reasonable persons may disagree as to the extent of the 
access to Merck's cost records that the GAO should be per-
mitted under the facts of this case. The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, granted the GAO all the access it wanted. Three 
other circuits held that there must be limits, and they have 
adopted the "Bristol test." However, no court has given se-
rious consideration to Merck's totally-unfounded contention 
that the GAO is not entitled to any of these records whatso-
ever. This Court should not be the first. As I have said, 
there should be some limits, but I would not foreclose the 
government entirely. 
In due course, I shall convert this memorandum into an ap-
propriate dissent . 
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81-1273 Bowsher v. ~ 
1'1e~Lc.k 
81-1472 ~ v. Bowsher 
Note from Jim Browning: 
I recommend that you do not join. 
At conference, you indicated that you would 
affirm in 81-1273 (no indirect costs) and "probably 
reverse in 81-1472. You indicated considerable doubt 
about your position; that you were not at rest; that you 
would take a closer look at 81-1472; and that you might 
well affirm. After conference, we talked and you again 
looked at my bench memo, indicating that you probably 
agree with Justice Stevens and Justice Rehnquist to affirm 
on both. I continue to agree with Justices Stevens and 
Rehnquist. 
I take it that you are, as is everyone else but 
Justice White, prepared to affirm the CADC that the GAO 
does not get indirect costs. The issue for you in whether 
the GO gets anything here. I would analyze the problem 
differently from the way that Justice O'Connor approaches 
the problem. 
Both the language in the statutes and in the 
contracts apply to fixed price contracts without 
qualification. Justice O'Connor creates a distinction for 
fixed price contracts that has no basis, save in her 
policy arguments, and that has not been adopted by any 
court - circuit or district - to my knowledge. It seems 
'--
to me that if Congress had desired to exclude (or treat 
differently) fixed-price contracts from the provisions' 
operations (§2313(b) and §254(c), it could have explicitly 
done so indeed, as it has done in the Truth-in 
Negotiations Act and in the Renegotiation Act. Justice 
O'Connor's conclusion that the acess-to-records provisions 
do not include fixed price contracts - unless the terms 
are expressly tied to costs or the costs are discussed in 
actual negotiations - conflicts with the language of the 
provisions, which by their very presence require 
disclosure regardless of other terms of "actual 
negotiations (whicy by the way are rare in fixed price 
contracts - by definition). 
A factor that I found persuasive - and that 
Justice O'Connor does not discuss - is that, not only has 
Merck contracted to disclose some "directly pertinent" 
records in its possession, but it has also contracted to 
put a provision in its subcontracts securing access for 
GAO to the "directly pertinent" records of its 
. ' 
subcontracts. If Justice O'Connor's opinion holds a 
, ~ ~ 1~---------
Court, and fixed price contracts do not allow access to -
any cost records, not only will the contract provisions at 
~
issue here be nullities, but so will the provisions for 
S' 
acces to the records of Merck's subcontractors. From the 
legislative history, it seems clear to me that the purpose 
of the access-to-records provision is to allow GAO to 
assess the reasonableness of the contractor's costs and 
pricing by insuring full access by the comptroller to all 
"directly pertinent" cost and pricing records, including 
subcontractors' records that otherwise might be 
unreachable because they would not be in the custody and 
control of the contracts. Justice O'Connor's reading 
ignores, I think, a large portion of the contract 
provision itself and violates the well-established rule _______... 
that a contract and a statute should be read so as to give 
meaning to all their provisions. I think that cost 
records can be "directly pertinent" to fixed price 
contracts and that the access-to-records provisions hhere 
give GAO the authority to request those records. The 
circuits are in agreement on this issue. 
~n this case, for me, is whether GAO 
gets indirect costs. As authorized in my bench memo, pp. 
11-21, I agree with the CADC, CA2 and CA3 that the 
indirect costs are not "directly pertinent." 
disagree with Justice O'Connor that 
I obviously 
the Bristol 
distinction is "a compromise which is not the product of 
reasoned analysis. {p. 23). 
Justice White is to circulate his dissenting 
opinion soon. I would wait. 
JOB 
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CHAMBERS OF' 
-.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
February 18, 1983 
Re: 81-1273- Bowsher v. Merck & Co.: 
81-1472 - Merck & Co. v. Bowsher 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
! 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~u:prtmt <!J!!url of firt ~b ~tait.tr 
Jfaglpn.gi!ltt.gl. <!J. ZO~J!~ 
February 23, 1983 
RE: Nos. 81-1273 and 1472 Bowsher v. Merck & Co, ,Inc. 
Dear Bi 11: 
Please join me in your opinion in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
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February 24, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1273- Bowsher v. Merck & Co., Inc. 
No. 81-1472- Merck & Co., Inc. v. Bowsher 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
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February 28, 1983 
81-1273 and 81-1472 The Merck & Co., Inc. Cases 
Dear Sandra: 
After reviewing over the weekend the three opin-
ions that have been circulated, I have concluded reluctantly 
that we should affirm the Court of Appeals in both of these 
cases. 
At the time of our Conference and sharinq your 
concern as to nunrestricted snooping" by government audi-
tors, I voted tentatively to reverse in 81-1472. You make a 
strong argument for reversal, and I agree with it as a mat-
ter of policy. But I now fino it difficult to get away from 
the statutory language - language incorporated into Merck's 
contract with the government. No exception is made for 
"fixed price contracts", and at best the legislative hi~tory 
is ambiguous. 
Based on research by my clerk, there does not ap-
pear to be any Court of Appeals authority for reading this 
exception into either the statute or this type of contract. 
There are opinions to the contrary by CA2 and CA3, as well 
as CADC in this case. 
Bill Rehnquist's position now seems correct to me, 
and I probably wi11 join him though I may suggest that he 
expressly include the holding of the District Court that 
access is barred "with respect to research an~ development, 
marketi.l'lg and promotion, distribution, and administration". 
I particularly regret my decision as it is evident 
that you have put a great deal of effort into your opinlon. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1273 
CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
81-1273 v. 
MERCK & CO., INC. 
MERCK & CO., INC., PETITIONER 
81-1472 v. 
CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
UNITED STATES 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
The Court wholeheartedly accepts Merck's contention 
that, when the terms and conditions of a government con-
tract "are not expressly tied to the contractor's costs and the 
contractor makes no representations regarding its costs dur-
ing the course of negotiations, none of the contractor's cost 
records is subject to inspection by the Comptroller General." 
Ante, at 2. Merck's theory has been emphatically rejected 
by every Court of Appeals that has considered it, 1 and, in my 
'In addition to the opinion below in the present case, 665 F . 2d 1236 
(CADC 1981), see SmithKline Corp. v. Staats , 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), 
cert. pending, No. 81-2082; United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F. 
Q.11~ ... w~ ~ boU..o. 2~ c:7 ~ Li~ & ~ ~taats~·.; 2~ ::;; ,~ \t'~ \Q,_ ~ 
q~ ~ ~o\~~~.~' ~Ak~~ .~ . 
~ ~ ~ ~ ..k o·~·,. ~ 0"'\ A~"'~~ ~GM, '* ;, &...... ~ Aub4 w~ (_CJ<V-Q.o ~ ~ - &ox. ~ 
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view, we should do likewise, because the result Merck seeks 
can be achieved only by distorting the statutory language and 
the legislative history. The statutory provisions at issue, 10 
U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c), clearly were in-
tended to allow the GAO a reasonable degree of access to con-
tractors' records needed to determine whether prices 
charged to the government were excessive. Hence, I 
dissent. 
I 
In each of the four contracts involved here, the United 
States agreed to purchase certain pharmaceutical products 
from Merck at a fixed price. In each instance, Merck pro-
posed a contract price based on its catalog or "market" price, 
and the government contracting officer accepted the proposal 
without any "haggling" or other negotiation as to price. 
Each of the contracts contains the statutorily-mandated pro-
vision allowing the GAO the right to inspect Merck's books 
and records that are "directly pertinent" to the contract. 
The GAO now seeks to examine those Merck records that 
indicate the cost to Merck of the goods sold to the govern-
ment. The GAO deems such an examination necessary to 
carry out its statutory duty to "investigate . . . all matters 
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of pub-
lic funds," and to "make recommendations looking to greater 
economy or efficiency in public expenditures." 31 U. S. C. 
§ 53(a). 
denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978); and Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 
385 F . 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). Apparently 
recognizing the untenability of the argument advanced here by Merck, the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer in Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F. 
Supp. 1388 (SDNY 1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA21980), aff'd by an equally 
divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981), did not even dispute that it was 
"obliged by the terms of the contracts to provide access to records of its 
manufacturing costs, records which relate to the pricing of the products de-
livered and records required to verify all data obtained during the course of 
the review." 428 F. Supp., at 1389. 
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By inspecting Merck's cost records, the GAO hopes to be 
able to estimate whether the contract price paid by the gov-
ernment was a fair one. The GAO has confirmed by experi-
ence the common-sense observation that the mere "fact that 
a product is listed in a manufacturer's catalog and offered to 
any customer is no assurance that . . . the standard catalog 
price is reasonable." 2 If the GAO's inspection were to re-
veal that Merck's prices were unreasonably high, the GAO 
presumably would recommend to the contracting agencies 
that they "negotiate prices more carefully or . . . obtain 
greater competition in future similar procurements," 3 or that 
they take other action "looking to greater economy or effi-
ciency," 31 U. S. C. § 53(a), in future expenditures. 
The Court concludes, however, that, despite the inclusion 
of the access-to-records provision in the contracts, the GAO 
has no right to inspect Merck's books to determine how much 
it cost Merck to produce the products sold to the govern-
ment. Although the Court's exact rationale for this conclu-
sion is far from clear, 4 it appears to be loosely based upon 
2 Hearings on the Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before 
the Subcomm. for Special Investigations of the House Comm. on Armed 
Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8 (1963) (remarks of Robert Keller, Gen-
eral Counsel of the GAO). 
3 Joint App., at 23a (affidavit of Paul Dembling, General Counsel of the 
GAO). 
• In Part II of its opinion, the Court observes that the phrase "directly 
pertinent" refers to the circumstances surrounding the specific contract at 
issue, that it limits the GAO's authority by requiring a close connection be-
tween the records sought and the underlying contract, and that it indicates 
congressional concern for the privacy of contractors. I agree with these 
general propositions. In Part III of the opinion, the Court rejects the 
GAO's claim of a right to inspect virtually all of Merck's cost records, and I 
agree with this conclusion. Then, however, in Part IIID, without any 
analysis, the Court makes a logically unsound leap to the conclusion that 
because the GAO's claim of a right to inspect all of Merck's cost records is 
not sustainable, the general "interpretative principles" indentified in Part 
II support a holding that the GAO is not entitled to any cost records 
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two premises: first, that, by their very nature, a contractor's 
cost records are not "directly pertinent" to a fixed-price con-
tract, unless the government explicitly inquires about costs 
during the contractual negotiations; and, second, that the 
phrase "directly pertinent" must be very narrowly con-
strued, because Congress passed this legislation for a limited 
anti-fraud purpose, with only "incidental" broader aims in 
mind. The Court is wrong on both of these points. 
II 
I begin with the language of the statute. Jackson Transit 
Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union,-- U.S.--
(1982); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 568 
(1979). The legislation at issue requires unadvertised gov-
ernment contracts to include a clause allowing the GAO to ex-
amine any of the contractor's books, documents, papers, or 
records "that directly pertain to, and involve transactions re-
lating to, the contract .... " 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b). See 41 
U.S. C. §254(c). Nothing in the statutory language ex-
cludes records pertaining to fixed-price contracts (in general) 
or contracts based on catalog prices (in particular). Nor 
does anything in the statutes suggest in any way that the 
GAO must suspect fraud or wrongdoing before it can exercise 
its right to examine the relevant books and records. There-
fore, the GAO's claim of a right of access to Merck's cost 
records is valid unless the documents the GAO seeks to in-
spect are not "directly pertinent" to, or do not "involve trans-
actions relating to," Merck's contracts with the government. 
" '[I]t is hard to imagine anything more directly related to a 
contract than the cost of producing the items covered by it or 
the matters going into the makeup of the price."' Eli Lilly 
& Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904, 913 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 
U. S. 959 (1978). Accord, SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 
F. 2d 201, 208-209 (CA3 1981); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 
United States, 385 F. 2d 1013, 1016 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 
whatsoever. 
81-1273 AND 81-1472-DISSENT 
BOWSHER v. MERCK 8i CO. 5 
390 U. S. 988 (1968). The Court's argument to the contrary 
is based on the proposition that Merck's production costs do 
not "directly pertain" to the contract because they were irrel-
evant to the negotiation of the contract or to a determination 
that the contract was performed in accordance with its 
terms. The plain language of the access provision, however, 
entitles the GAO to records directly pertinent to the contract, 
which means all aspects of the contract; the statutory lan-
guage does not in any way limit the GAO's access to records 
directly pertinent to only the contract's negotiation or 
performance. 
The Court cites nothing in the statutory wording that sup-
ports its holding. 5 Its conclusion is founded on the errone-
ous premise that if the contractor made no representations, 
and the government's negotiator made no inquiries, as to the 
contractor's production costs, such costs must be considered 
to have been and to be irrelevant to the government's deci-
sion to enter into the contract. Obviously, however, in in-
stances where the contractual price of an item was unduly 
higher than the amount it cost to produce the item, the gov-
ernment most likely would not have agreed to the contract 
had it known of this fact. Therefore, even looking at the 
statutory language alone, The Court's contention that 
Merck's production costs are not directly pertinent to these 
contracts is untenable. 
III 
Even if, contrary to my belief, the statutory language is 
6 Indeed, all the Court has to say about the literal statutory wording is 
that the phrase "directly pertinent" refers to the circumstances surround-
ing the contract at issue, and that it limits the GAO's authority by requir-
ing a close connection between the records sought and the underlying con-
tract, ante, at 6, and that the government's interpretation of "directly 
pertinent" is inconsistent with the limiting language of the statute and the 
policy behind that language. Ante, at 11. One can readily accept all of 
these general propositions without concluding, as the Court does, that they 
support a holding that the government must be denied access to all of 
Merck's cost records. 
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somehow regarded as ambiguous, resort to the legislative 
history further refutes the Court's view. The legislative his-
tory of the access-to-records provisions is relatively brief and 
to the point. It demonstrates without the slightest doubt 
that Congress intended to allow the GAO authority to exam-
ine a contractor's books to evaluate government procurement 
techniques by ascertaining whether the government had paid 
a reasonable price for the contractor's goods or services, even 
in instances where the GAO does not have reason to suspect 
that the contractor acted in an improper manner. 
The Court states, ante, at 13, that Rep. Hardy, the bill's 
sponsor, "regarded the bill primarily as a tool for protecting 
the Government from being defrauded in [a] particular trans-
action," and that he thought the access authority would have 
merely "incidental value" in allowing the GAO to detect other 
weaknesses in the procurement process. This is patently in-
correct. Rep. Hardy clearly indicated that the bill was in-
tended to improve the adequacy of government procurement 
techniques in various ways. He expressly remarked: 
"The major purposes of this bill are twofold: One, to give 
the Comptroller General the proper tools to do the job 
the Congress has instructed him to do; and, two, to pro-
vide a deterrent to improprieties and wastefulness in the 
negotiation of contracts." I d., at 13198.6 
The Court ignores the first of these two "major purposes." 
As noted above, Congress has instructed the GAO to "inves-
tigate all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and 
application of public funds," and to "make recommendations 
looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expendi-
tures." 31 U. S. C. §53( a). 7 There is thus no warrant for 
' The Court, ante, at 12, n. 12, distorts this quotation by gratuitously 
inserting the word "audit" in brackets. 
7 In addition, [t]he Comptroller General is authorized and directed to 
make an expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the 
Government . . . which . . . will enable Congress to determine whether 
81-1273 AND 81-1472-DISSENT 
BOWSHER v. MERCK & ·CO. 7 
Merck's conclusion that the access-to-records provisions were 
not intended to further the GAO's ability to perform these 
functions. 
Rep. Hardy early explained to his colleagues that normal 
procurement procedures called for competitive bidding but 
that procurement by negotiation was sometimes necessary. 
In the latter context, where there is no competitive bidding 
to "operate[] as a brake on the price which a contractor can 
demand from the Government," Rep. Hardy saw the need to 
establish "every reasonable safeguard against waste and ex-
travagance in the spending" of government funds. 97 Gong. 
Rec. 13198 (1951). 8 He felt that, no matter how "conscien-
tious and honest" the government representatives might be, 
the contractor's representatives would, in the great majority 
of cases, have a tremendous advantage from the standpoint 
of both training and experience. Ibid. Thus, there was 
"every chance in the world that the Government [would] 
come out on the short end of the deal," and Rep. Hardy 
deemed it necessary to "at least enable the [GAO] to check 
the transaction, both from the Government records and the 
contractors' books." Ibid. 
Rep. Hardy then gave some factual examples of "typical 
situations in which the authority of this bill would play an 
effective part." Ibid. One such example was about a con-
tractor who charged the government a great deal higher rate 
of overhead than it did its private customers. Another 
"vivid example of how the authority would enable the GAO to 
do an effective job" involved a 
public funds have been economically and efficiently administered and ex-
pended." 31 U. S. C. § 60. 
8 In light of Rep. Hardy's repeated admonitions on the need to establish 
every reasonable safeguard against waste and extravagance in government 
J cpending, I find it incredible that the Court concludes, ante , at 12-13, that 
Congress thought the access authority would have only "incidental value" 
towards avoiding such weaknesses in the procurement process. 
8 
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"situation where the Government was buying parts from 
an automobile dealer who, in turn, was getting them 
from a parts distributor who, in turn, was getting them 
from a small tool shop. Naturally, the price paid by the 
Government included profits upon profits and completely 
wasteful administrative and handling costs." Ibid. 
The sponsor observed that that it "would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for the GAO to detect such a situation without 
the right afforded" in the bill. Ibid. 
It is apparent from Rep. Hardy's remarks that the bill was 
intended to guard against more than fraud and abuse. Con-
tractors employing experienced, well-trained negotiators 
could not be accused of wrongdoing simply for "outnegotiat-
ing" their government counterparts. The automobile dealer 
who sold the parts to the government at retail was not acting 
fraudulently. 9 Even the contractor who charged the gov-
ernment more than its private customers could not, without 
more, be accused of illegal or unethical conduct. 10 Yet Rep. 
Hardy plainly intended that his bill apply in such situations. 
After Rep. Hardy finished his opening statement, he an-
swered a number of questions from other Members of the 
House. The following exchange ensued: 
"Mr. Mills: ... What the gentleman from Virginia 
9 This "vivid example of how this authority would enable the GAO to do 
an effective job," 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951), which the Court ignores, to-
tally belies the Court's claim, ante, at 14, that its holding will not impede 
use of the access provisions to cure the problems explicitly mentioned by 
Rep. Hardy in his examples. 
'
0 The Court, ante, at 14, distorts Rep. Hardy's language and intent in 
setting forth this example by implying that Rep. Hardy suggested that his 
example involved a contractor who misrepresented his overhead costs to 
the government. Although Rep. Hardy's did state that overhead costs 
are "supposed to be based upon the experience of the contractor in per-
forming similar work in the past," 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951), Rep. Hardy 
in no way suggested in his example that the contractor had made any mis-
representations as to this point. 
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and the committee, as I understand, are endeavoring to 
do, you are endeavoring to pursue a situation that may 
be fraudulent, for example, so that the General Account-
ing Office might look into that question. . . . 
Mr. Hardy: The gentleman is right, with this excep-
tion that I think should be clearly understood, that there 
are a lot of other situations besides those involving fraud 
which might be uncovered. 
Mr. Mills: The gentleman from Virginia did not hear 
me perhaps. I said an example would be fraud. 
Mr. Hardy: That is correct." Id., at 13199 (emphasis 
added). 
In light of this colloquy, it is quite untenable to assert, as the 
Court does, ante, at 13, that it is "not clear" that Congress 
was motivated by any purpose broader than that of "protect-
ing the Government from being defrauded in [a] particular 
transaction." 11 
The debate continued two days later when Rep. Hardy 
proposed an amendment that would have allowed agency 
heads the discretion to omit the access-to-records clause from 
contracts with foreign contractors, id., at 13371, and Rep. 
Harvey proposed an amendment that would have exempted 
"a manufacturer or processor who is a supplier of material to 
a primary contractor and who is not a subcontractor" from 
the scope of the bill's coverage. Id., at 13376. Both of 
11 The Court repeatedly draws solace from the undisputed fact that the 
primary purpose of the access legislation was to protect the government 
against fraud. Ante, e. g., at 12, 13. The Court ignores the fact that we 
must give effect to other, subsidiary congressional purposes as well. See 
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774-775 (1979); United States v. 
Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 377 (1978). Since "the vast majority of the legisla-
tive references" do not evidence an intent to restrict use of the access-to-
records provisions "to situations involving impropriety," SmithKline v. 
Staats, supra, at 205, I think it clear that an important, even if only sec-
ondary, purpose of this legislation was to provide the government with a 
means to avoid providing its contractors excessive profits. 
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these proposals were ultimately defeated, but, during the 
lively debate on the proposed amendments, several Members 
of Congress stated without contradiction that the bill would 
allow the GAO extremely broad authority to examine 
records. For example, Rep. Harvey asked whether, if the 
bill became law, a subcontractor of a primary government 
contractor "would be subject to having all his books opened 
up for inspection by Government officials." I d., at 13372 
(emphasis added). Rep. Hardy replied that it would, unless 
the subcontractor only supplied some "casual item" in connec-
tion with the performance of the contract. Ibid. Based on 
this understanding, Rep. Harvey later argued that his limit-
ing amendment was needed, because otherwise "every manu-
facturer . . . of . . . goods that eventually find their way into 
defense production ... is going to have to supply all the an-
swers to the GAO on everything he manufactures." I d., at 
13376. "[E]very section of his books will have to come under 
the complete scrutiny of the GAO." Ibid. In response, 
Rep. Hardy did not dispute this characterization of the scope 
of the GAO's authority, but he nevertheless opposed the Har-
vey amendment, because it "would make it impossible fre-
quently to obtain information which would be vital in the 
study of a contract." Ibid. 
Rep. Hoffman, a strong opponent of the bill, several times 
during the debate observed that the "GAO under this bill can 
go into the books of [contractors] and ask and get from them 
anything and everything they want." I d., at 13373. He in-
dicated his belief that the bill would allow the GAO "to snoop 
into [a contractor's] books and find out what [the goods or 
services] cost[] or what will be a fair price or what profit we 
make." Ibid. See also id., at 13375, 13377. Standing 
alone, of course, the statements of an opponent of the bill, 
such as Rep. Hoffman, would not carry much weight, 12 but 
12 See, e. g., National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 
U. S. 612, 639-640 (1967); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 
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here, even though all comments pro and con were made in the 
midst of a free-wheeling debate, the proponent of the bill, 
Rep. Hardy, in no way took issue with Rep. Hoffman's view 
of the scope of GAO's authority. Rep. Hardy's essential re-
sponse was that it was necessary to require contractors to af-
ford the GAO this broad authority, and that Rep. Hoffman's 
fears of excessive GAO "snooping" were groundless, because 
the GAO would have neither the inclination nor the man-
power to examine the records of every individual supplier. 
I d., at 13376, 13377. 
The original Hardy bill required the inclusion, in negoti-
ated contracts, of a clause allowing the GAO the right to ex-
amine any records that were "pertinent" to the contract. At 
the very end of the debate, Rep. Hoffman proposed the 
amendment that added the word "directly" before the word 
"pertinent." I d., at 13377. Rep. Hoffman explained that he 
had discussed his amendment with Rep. Hardy, the bill's 
sponsor, and that, although the amendment was "not all that 
it should be," it was the most that Rep. Hardy would agree 
to. Ibid. 13 Rep. Hoffman then stated that the purpose of 
341 u. s. 384, 394 (1951). 
13 In fact, it appears that it was Rep. Hardy, not Rep. Hoffman, who 
proposed the language of the amendment that limited the government to 
"directly pertinent" records. Rep. Hoffman stated that this language was 
"the best he [Rep. Hardy] could think of." 97 Cong. Rec. 13377 (1951). 
Apparently what happened is that Rep. Hoffman and Rep. Hardy had a 
private meeting, during which Rep. Hoffman suggested the need for a lim-
iting amendment. Rep. Hoffman had stronger language in mind, which 
Rep. Hardy refused to accept. Rep. Hardy must have then proposed the 
"directly pertinent" language to placate his colleague, and Rep. Hoffman, 
though not satisfied, "was rather forced to accept it and to agree with 
him." Ibid. Thus, although the Court is correct in stating, ante, at 8, 
that the amendment "circumscribe[d] the inquiry the Comptroller General 
was authorized to undertake," it is clear that this circumscription was only 
to the extent agreeable to Rep. Hardy, who, as shown by his opposition to 
the Harvey amendment, clearly would not have agreed to a sharp reduc-
tion in the scope of his bill. 
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his amendment was "to limit the snooping that may be car-
ried on under this bill which we do not have the votes to de-
feat." Ibid. At that point, Rep. Hardy remarked that he 
had no objection to the amendment, and it was accepted with-
out further discussion. Ibid. 14 
In light of Rep. Hardy's consistent position throughout the 
debate, it cannot plausibly be argued that he agreed to the 
Hoffman amendment with the understanding that it effected 
a drastic reduction in the scope of the bill's coverage or pur-
pose. As outlined above, Rep. Hardy continuously spoke of 
the need to provide a mechanism to combat waste and ex-
travagance in federal procurement, and he vigorously and 
successfully opposed the Harvey amendment, which would 
have significantly limited the bill's scope. His acceptance of 
the addition of the word "directly" appears to have been 
largely a sop to the bill's opponents. The most that can be 
said is that Rep. Hardy accepted the amendment to allay con-
cerns that the legislation "would let the GAO go into every-
body's business and look it over if they just wanted to take a 
look at it .... " Id., at 13373 (Rep. Hoffman). The amend-
ment gave assurance that the bill would not be used as a basis 
for inspection of books and records having no substantial con-
nection with government procurement. But the amendment 
definitely was not intended to bar the GAO's access to 
records legitimately needed to assess the reasonableness of 
prices charged to the government, and thereby to protect the 
government against waste, excessive prices, and ineffective 
procurement. 15 
" Immediately after passage of the Hoffman amendment, the House 
passed the bill, as amended, 97 Cong. Rec. 13378 (1951). On the following 
day, the Senate passed it without any debate whatsoever. Id., at 13411. 
'
5 Accord, Merck & Co. v. Staats, 665 F . 2d 1236, 1249 (CADC 1981) 
(Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Staats, 574 F. 2d 904, 916 (CA7), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978); Com-
ment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1148, 1157-1158 (1979) ("[t]he court [in Eli Lilly] 
correctly rejected Lilly's argument that the insertion of the word 'directly' 
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IV 
Although, until today, all courts have unequivocally re-
jected Merck's argument that the GAO may not inspect any 
cost records in situations such as the one here, the court 
below in the present case, and some other lower courts in 
similar cases, 16 have refused to uphold the GAO's claim of a 
right of access to all the cost records it wishes to examine, 
including some records that are undeniably essential to an ac-
curate determination of whether the government wasted 
money by entering into these contracts. Applying the so-
called "Bristol test," 17 these courts have limited the GAO's 
access to records pertaining to a contractor's 
"manufacturing costs (including raw and packaging ma-
terials, labor and fringe benefits, quality control and su-
pervision); manufacturing overhead (including plant ad-
ministration, production planning, warehousing, utilities 
and security); royalty expenses; and delivery costs." 18 
into the 'directly pertinent' formula sharply narrowed the scope of inquiry 
to be allowed the GAO"). 
In SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201, 210 (CA3 1981), cert. 
pending, No. 81-2082, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the Hoffman amendment "meant nothing." The 
court therefore adopted the standard formulated in Bristol Laboratories v. 
Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 (SDNY 1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980), 
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981), but it did so only 
because the government did not suggest any alternative definition of "di-
rectly pertinent" records that it wished the court to adopt if it did not agree 
with the government's reading of the statute. For an explanation of the 
Bristol standard, and my reasons for believing that the Bristol test is not 
entirely correct, see part IV, irifra. 
16 See SmithKline Corp . v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pend-
ing, No. 81-2082; Bristol Laboratories v. Staats, 428 F. Supp. 1388 (SDNY 
1977), aff'd, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA21980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451 
u. s. 400 (1981). 
17 The test was first adopted by the District Court in Bristol Labora-
tories v. Staats, supra. 
18 428 F . Supp., at 1389. 
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The Bristol test excludes: 
"data with respect to research and development, mar-
keting and promotion, distribution and administration 
(except to the extent that these areas may be included in 
the factors listed above). 19 
This test has been described, perhaps inaccurately/0 as being 
based on a "direct costs v. indirect costs" or an "allocated 
costs v. unallocated costs" dichotomy. 
The courts that have adopted this test have no doubt been 
influenced by a need to come up with some form of reasonable 
limitation on the broad access demand the GAO has made. 
The GAO claims it has the right to examine records pertain-
ing to every cost "defrayed from commingled general reve-
nues that include the government's payments under the con-
tract." I agree that the GAO's demand is somewhat 
overbroad; the Court correctly observes, ante, at 9, that it 
would require Merck to allow inspection of cost records to-
tally unrelated to the government contracts, such as records 
of expenditures for raw materials used to manufacture prod-
ucts other than those sold to the government under the con-
tracts. However, I am not convinced that the proper conclu-
sion is to limit the GAO to the records allowable under the 
Bristol test. 
The Bristol court adopted its standard solely on the basis 
of the cost records that the contractor was willing to disclose 
to the GAO. The court felt that the contractor's offer "re-
flected a responsible and reasonable effort to distinguish 'di-
rectly pertinent' matter within the meaning of the access to 
records clause." 21 The court thus accepted the contractor's 
contention that the cost records it was not willing to disclose 
19 I d., at 1389-1390. 
20 The Bristol court itself stated that the costs records held examinable 
under its test are "by no means ... limit[ed]" to direct costs. !d., at 1391. 
21 Ibid. 
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had "only the most general relation, if any, to the prices 
charged." 22 
Although cost records having, at most, only an insubstan-
tial relation to the price charged are not "directly pertinent" 
to the contract, it is apparent that many of the records 
deemed unexaminable under Bristol relate to costs that may 
have had a critical bearing on the prices charged, and that 
would be of central importance to a GAO inquiry into the fair-
ness of these prices. In the pharmaceutical industry, it has 
been estimated that "direct" or "allocated" costs comprise 
only about nine per cent of the sale price of individual prod-
ucts. The so-called "indirect" or "unallocated" costs-pri-
marily research and development, advertising and other pro-
motion, general administrative expenses, taxes, and profit-
are much larger and economically more significant. 23 Yet, 
under the Bristol test, the GAO is denied access to all 
. records in this category, thus making it impossible for the 
GAO to make an accurate assessment of the fairness of the 
prices and thus the adequacy of the government's procure-
ment technique. 24 
In my view, the correct rule in a case of this nature is that 
any books or records that bear directly on the question 
"'Id., at 1390. 
23 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, supra, at 913; Merck & Co. v. Staats, supra, 
at 1247 (Mikva, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reekie, Price 
and Quality Competition in the United States Drug Industry, 26 J. Indus. 
Econ. 223, 235 (1978); Rucker, Public Policy Considerations in the Pricing 
of Prescription Drugs in the United States, 4 Int'l J. Health Services 171, 
173 (1974). 
24 For example, the Bristol test does not allow the GAO to examine a 
contractor's records of advertising costs. One would imagine that, if the 
GAO were aware that a great percentage of the cost of the products of a 
certain company went to support a large advertising campaign, rather 
than, say, to maintain quality control, the GAO might recommend to the 
contracting agency that it not deal with that company in the future. Yet, 
under the Bristol test, the GAO would not be able to obtain the information 
needed to make such a recommendation. 
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whether the government paid a fair price for the goods or 
services it purchased are "directly pertinent" to the contract 
of purchase. Under this test, for example, the cost records 
of an advertising campaign to promote the particular prod-
ucts sold to the governments, or a research project designed 
specifically to develop or improve these products, would 
clearly be "directly pertinent." On the other hand, records 
of advertising campaigns and research projects involving 
only unrelated products would lack the requisite degree of 
pertinence. Of course, in many instances a commercial ad-
vertisement or a research project will be designed to promote 
or develop both products sold to the government and other, 
unrelated products. With respect to cost records of efforts 
such as these, there might be some close questions as to 
whether such records are "directly pertinent" to the govern-
ment contracts. If, however, the GAO could bear the bur-
den of proving that the records are of costs that likely had a 
direct and substantial impact on the price charged to the gov-
ernment under the contract, I would allow the GAO access to 
the records. 
v 
The inquiry does not necessarily come to an end once the 
GAO establishes that it has a statutory and contractual right 
to inspect particular records. In addition to the statutory 
"directly pertinent" limitation, the GAO's right of inspection 
is further circumscribed by constitutional standards, such as 
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. 
Where, as here, the GAO wishes to see a contractor's 
records and the contractor declines to accede voluntarily to a 
GAO request, the GAO must issue an administrative sub-
poena. If the contractor refuses to comply with the sub-
poena, the GAO must apply to a District Court for enforce-
ment of the subpoena. 31 U. S. C. § 54(c) (Supp. V 1981).25 
25 The GAO has had this subpoena power only since 1980. See Pub. L. 
96-226 § 102(c), 94 Stat. 312 (Apr. 3, 1980) (codified as 31 U. S. C. §54( c)). 
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Once in the District Court, a contractor such as Merck has 
the benefit of all of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence limiting the bounds of an agency's right to demand the 
production of a private entity's records. 
Essentially, in assessing an agency's application for en-
forcement of an administrative subpoena, we have insisted 
that the agency's demand be reasonable. The general rule is 
that "when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate 
books or records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the 
subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, 
and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unduly 
burdensome." See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 544 
(1967). See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 
652-653 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 
327 U. S. 186, 208 (1946); 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise § 4:15 (2d ed. 1978). This standard is a flexible one 
that takes into account the extent to which the public interest 
will be served if the subpoena is enforced. See v. City of Se-
attle, supra, at 545. 
In the present case, Merck has claimed that compliance 
with the GAO's demand would entail substantial expense and 
disruption of its operations. This claim is based on evidence 
that the proposed GAO inspection would require Merck to al-
low an entire team of GAO auditors to remain on site at 
Merck for over two years. 26 This, of course, is a matter for 
Prior to 1980, the GAO could only sue for specific performance of its con-
tractual right of access. See, e. g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 
385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968). The GAO 
can still opt in favor of this latter, slower course, but the government does 
not make any claim that its rights in a specific performance action would be 
any different from those in an action for judicial enforcement of an adminis-
trative subpoena. See Oral Arg. Trans., at 29-30. 
26 At the time the GAO issued its demand for access to Merck's records, 
it made identical demands to five other drug companies. Apparently, only 
one of the six companies, Hoffman LaRoche, Inc. (Hoffman), voluntarily 
acceded to GAO's request. According to Merck, a team of GAO auditors 
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first-instance determination by the District Court, but, if the 
inspection would in fact cause such a high degree of interfer-
ence with Merck's business, a credible argument could be 
made that compliance would be unreasonable and unduly bur-
densome, and that the GAO's access should therefore be lim-
ited in some way. 
VI 
Reasonable persons can disagree as to the extent of the ac-
cess to a contractor's cost records that the GAO should be 
permitted in a case such as this. For example, two Courts of 
Appeals have granted the GAO all the access it wanted. 27 
Three other Courts of Appeals have held that there must be 
limits, and they have adopted the Bristol test. 28 JUSTICE 
BRENNAN and JUSTICE REHNQUIST today indicate that they 
would do likewise. Ante, at--. Until today, however, no 
appellate court29 has accepted the totally-unfounded conten-
tion that the GAO is not entitled to any of these records 
whatsoever. I agree that there must be appropriate limits, 
but the government should not be foreclosed entirely. 
In view of the foregoing, I would remand these cases to the 
District Court, with instructions to uphold the GAO's request 
for access to Merck's "direct" and "indirect" cost records, but 
remained on site at Hoffman from July 1975 to July 1977 without complet-
ing the review, and, in July 1977, Hoffman terminated its voluntary par-
ticipation. Of course, even if Merck's claim as to the Hoffman precedent is 
accurate, Merck would have to prove that a GAO review of its records 
would require similar or greater disruption. 
Z7 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. 
Abbott Laboratories, supra; and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, supra. 
28 In addition to the opinion below in the present case, 665 F. 2d 1236 
(CADC 1981), see SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, supra; and Bristol Labora-
tories v. Staats, supra. 
29 I might also note that, with one exception, see Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Staats, supra, every District Court in the cases cited in notes 19 and 20, 
supra, was similarly unreceptive to the claim that the GAO was not enti-
tled to any cost records whatsoever. 
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only to the extent that: 1) the records sought by GAO likely 
had a direct and substantial impact on the prices charged to 
the government under the contracts; and 2) the request is 
reasonable in scope and would not unduly burden Merck. To 
the extent the GAO's demand conforms to these statutory 
and constitutional standards, Merck should be required to al-
low the GAO's examination to proceed. 30 
30 The holding I would adopt comports with the Court's "two guideposts" 
for interpretation of the access authority. Ante, at 8. First, it would pro-
tect contractors from unwarranted "broad-ranging governmental intrusion 
into their business affairs," and, second, it would ensure that the requested 
records have a "close connection" to the government contracts. More im-
portantly, it would give effect to the "third guidepost" identified by Jus-
TICE REHNQUIST, ante, at 2 n. 1, but neglected by the Court, "that the 
GAO is to be able to inspect records to fulfill its statutory responsibility." 
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81-1472 v. 
CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
UNITED STATES 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue before the Court is the scope of the authority of 
the Comptroller General of the United States to examine the 
records of a private contractor with whom the Government 
has entered into fixed-price 1 negotiated contracts. We con-
1 A pure fixed-price contract requires the contractor to furnish the goods 
or services for a fixed amount of compensation regardless of the costs of 
performance, thereby placing the risk of incurring unforeseen costs of per-
formance on the contractor rather than the Government. See 1 R. Nash 
and J. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law 413 (3d ed. 1977). Variations on 
the pure fixed-price contract may contain some formula or technique for 
adjusting the contract price to account for unforeseen cost elements. See 
id., at 413-415 (discussing fixed-price contract with escalation clause, 
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elude that, under the circumstances presented in this action, 
the Comptroller General may inspect the contractor's records 
of direct costs, but not records of indirect costs. 
I 
In 1973 Merck & Co., Inc. ("Merck") entered into three 
contracts with the Defense Supply Agency of the Depart-
ment of Defense and one contract with the Veterans Admin-
istration for the sale of pharmaceutical products to the Gov-
ernment. All four contracts were negotiated, rather than 
awarded after formal advertising. 2 The pharmaceutical 
products supplied under each contract were standard com-
mercial products sold by Merck in substantial quantities to 
the general public. App. 41a. The price term proposed by 
Merck for each contract was based on the catalog price at 
which Merck sold the item to the general public or was other-
wise determined by adequate competition. Before the 
award of each of the contracts at the fixed-price proposed by 
Merck, there was no actual negotiation of price, and the gov-
ernment contracting officers did not request Merck to submit 
cost data in connection with any of the four contracts. 
As required by 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. 
§254(c),3 each contract contained a standard access-to-
fixed-price incentive contract, and fixed-price redeterminable contract). 
' The Government employs two methods of procurement: advertised 
procurement, i. e., formal solicitation of competitive bids, and procure-
ment by negotiation. A negotiated contract is the method authorized by 
statute for use in situations in which the formal advertising and bidding 
procedure is deemed impractical or unnecessary. See 10 U. S. C. 
§ 2304(a); 41 U. S. C. § 252(c). In procuring by negotiation, the govern-
ment agency discusses the terms of the procurement with one or more con-
tractors and awards the contract to the party offering the terms most 
advantageous to the Government. 
3 10 U. S. C. § 2313(b), which applies to the Defense Supply Agency con-
tracts, provides: 
"Except as provided in subsection (c), each contract negotiated under 
this chapter shall provide that the Comptroller General and his represent-
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records clause granting the Comptroller General the right to 
examine any directly pertinent records involving transac-
tions related to the contract. Relying on these clauses, in 
August 1974 the Comptroller General issued a formal demand 
to Merck for access to the following: 
"all books, documents, papers, and other records di-
rectly pertinent to the contracts, which include, but are 
not limited to (1) records of experienced costs of direct 
materials, direct labor, overhead, and other pertinent 
corporate costs, (2) support for prices charged to the 
Government, and (3) such other information as may be 
necessary for use to review the reasonableness of the 
contract prices and the adequacy of the protection af-
forded the Government's interests." App. 18a.4 
atives are entitled, until the expiration of three years after final payment, 
to examine any books, documents, papers, or records of the contractor, or 
any of his subcontractors, that directly pertain to and involve transactions 
relating to, the contract or subcontract." 
The Veterans Administration contract is governed by 41 U. S. C. § 254(c), 
which provides in pertinent part: 
"All contracts negotiated without advertising shall include a clause to the 
effect that the Comptroller General of the United States ... shall until the 
expiration of three years after final payment have access to and the right to 
examine any directly pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of 
the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of 
and involving transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts." 
Despite the slight difference in wording, there is no substantive difference 
between the defense and civilian procurement statutes. 
• The Comptroller General issued identical demands to five other 
pharmaceutical companies. These access-to-records demands apparently 
were the product of congressional interest in competition and profits in the 
pharmaceutical industry generally. 
As early as 1971, Sen. Gaylord Nelson suggested during hearings on 
competition in the drug industry that the Comptroller General invoke his 
access-to-records authority "to take a look" at the costs incurred by 
pharmaceutical companies. Hearings on Competitive Problems in the 
Drug Industry Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select 
Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 8020 (1971). 
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Merck refused to comply with the Comptroller General's re-
quest and commenced this action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the Comptroller General's access demand 
exceeded his statutory authority. 5 The United States inter-
vened and counterclaimed to enforce the Comptroller Gener-
al's demand. 
The District Court granted partial summary judgment for 
each party. Rejecting Merck's argument that cost records 
are not "directly pertinent" to the fixed-price contracts that 
Following those hearings, Sen. Nelson's staff continued to urge the Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) to use the access provisions to obtain cost 
records "without any strings attached so that the high profits could be pub-
licized by product and firm." App. 144a; id., at 142a-148a. See also 
Hearings, supra, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 8537, 8581-8583 (1972). 
Finally in June 1973, the GAO responded by proposing a two-phase 
study of the economics of the pharmaceutical industry to be accomplished 
through voluntary participation by drug companies. Merck and five other 
companies agreed to cooperate in the first phase, which contemplated gath-
ering background data on the industry. In April1974, the GAO issued a 
proposal for the second phase of the study, aimed at developing data on 
"salient economic and operational aspects of the industry." App. 141a. 
Merck expressed its concern over participating in this phase without ade-
quate assurance of the confidentiality of the cost data it might be requested 
to supply. 
Initially the GAO agreed that the data regarding individual companies 
and individual drug products should remain confidential and anonymous. 
Id., at 150a. Senators Nelson and Kennedy and their staffs, however, re-
iterated that the subcommittee's objectives could be served only by publi-
cation of the data. Ibid. The Comptroller General's formal demand let-
ters to the six companies that had participated voluntarily in the Phase I 
study followed. 
5 Four of the remaining five pharmaceutical companies that received de-
mand letters also challenged the Comptroller General's request. See 
SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 201 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, Nos. 
81-2082, 81-2268; Bristol Laboratories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v. 
Staats, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA2 1980) (per curiam), aff'd by an equally divided 
Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981); United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F. 
2d 672 (CA7 1979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F. 2d 904 (CA7), cert. 
denied, 439 U. S. 959 (1978). 
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were the predicate of the GAO demand, the court permitted 
access to all records 
"directly pertaining to the pricing and cost of producing 
items furnished by . . . Merck under the . . . contracts 
. . . , including manufacturing costs (including raw and 
packaging materials, labor and fringe benefits, quality 
control and supervision), manufacturing overhead (in-
cluding plant administration, production ·planning, 
warehousing, utilities and security), royalty expenses, 
and delivery costs." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 
81-1273, p. 39a. 
The court barred access, however, to records "with respect 
to research and development, marketing and promotion, dis-
tribution, and administration." · I d., at 40a. In a brief per 
curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 665 F. 2d 1236 (1981). 
Both parties sought certiorari. In No. 81-1273, the 
United States petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals' 
determination that records of Merck's indirect costs are not 
subject to examination by the Comptroller General. In No. 
81-1472, Merck challenges the determination that records of 
its direct costs are "directly pertinent" to the contracts in 
question and are therefore subject to examination. Merck 
also contends that access to its cost records is barred because 
the Comptroller General's access demand was not made for a 
congressionally authorized purpose. We granted .certiorari 
on the petitions of both parties,-- U. S. -- (1982), and 
now affirm. 
II 
As with any issue of statutory construction, 6 we " 'must be-
gin with the language of the statute itself.'" Bread Political 
• The parties agree that the scope. of the Comptroller General's authority 
under the access-to-records clauses in the four contracts turns on the 
meaning of the statutory language, rather than on the intention of the par-
ties to the contract. We also emphasize at the outset that Merck does not 
challenge the authority of Congress to impose, as a condition.of doing busi-
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Action Committee v. FEC, 455 U. S. 577, -- (1982), quot-
ing Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 
176, 187 (1980). The focal point of controversy is the mean-
ing of the statutory phrases "directly pertinent to the con-
tract" and "involving transactions relating to the contract." 
It is plain from the face of the provisions that these are words 
of limitation designed to restrict the class of records to which 
access is permitted by requiring some close connection be-
tween the type of records sought and the particular contract. 
The legislative history of the access provisions underscores 
what the language reflects: the intention of Congress to limit 
to some degree the Comptroller General's aecess powers. 
As originally introduced, the bill now codified as 10 U. S. C. 
§ 2313(b) and 41 U. S. C. § 254(c) provided access to "perti-
nent" records "involving transactions related to" the con-
tract. See 97 Gong. Rec. 13371 (1951). 7 Rep. Hoffman op-
ness with the Government, a requirement that contractors disclose all of 
their cost records to the Comptroller General, regardless of the pertinence 
of these records to the particular contract. Rather, Merck bases its argu-
ments on its interpretation of the statutory language. 
7 This bill was modeled on, and as originally proposed was identical to, a 
January 1951 amendment to the First War Powers Act of 1941. See Act 
of January 12, 1951, 64 Stat. 1257. That amendment was a piece of emer-
gency legislation adopted in response to the crisis conditions created by the 
Korean War. Because of severe wartime inflation, many defense contrac-
tors holding fixed-priced contracts could not meet their obligations. To ale 
leviate the problem, Congress gave President Truman emergency author-
ity to renegotiate government contracts. See H. R. Rep. No. 3227, 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1950). The access-to-records provisions were in-
cluded in order to deter fraud and profiteering in the renegotiation process. 
96 Cong. Rec. 17123 (1951) (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("The amendment will 
give power to the General Accounting Office to go into the books and delve 
into the records of these contractors who have been relieved to determine 
whether or not there is fraud or overreaching or whether they have done 
anything untoward."). 
Although the initial access-to-records legislation in the January 1951 
amendments was of limited duration, Congress shortly thereafter passed 
the permanent version at issue here. Rep. Hardy, the sponsor of both the 
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posed the original bill on the ground that it permitted 
"unnecessary snooping expeditions" and allowed the GAO to 
"go into everybody's business and look it over if they just 
wanted to take a look at it." I d., at 13373. He therefore 
offered a floor amendment to insert the word "directly" be-
fore the word "pertinent," stating that the purpose of the 
amendment "is to limit the 'snooping' that may be carried on 
under this bill." I d., at 13377. The sponsor of the original 
bill, Rep. Hardy, did not oppose the amendment, and the 
amendment passed without debate or discussion. 
The passage of the Hoffman amendment clearly reveals 
that Congress did not want unrestricted "snooping" by the 
Comptroller General into the business records of a private 
contractor. The Government nevertheless attempts to dis-
count the significance of Congress' addition of the word "di-
rectly." Based on the lack of opposition to the limiting 
amendment by the bill's sponsor and the lack of debate, the 
Government argues that the Hoffman modification did not 
significantly alter the scope of the Hardy bill. We cannot 
agree. The only explanation in the legislative history of the 
meaning and purpose of the amendment is that of Rep. Hoff-
man. His statement, which, as the explanation of the spon-
sor of the language, is an "authoritative guide to the statute's 
construction," North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 
U. S. 512, -- (1982), expressly indicates that the intent of 
the amendment was to curtail the scope of investigation au-
thorized under the bill. Although, as the Government em-
phasizes, Rep. Hoffman did not have the votes to defeat the 
temporary and permanent access-to-records provisions, learned that gov-
ernment procurement officers were negotiating contract modifications 
under two permanent procurement statutes that lacked access provisions, 
the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Property 
and Administrative Services Act of 1949. "In order to plug this loophole," 
Rep. Hardy introduced the bill to require inclusion of access-to-records 
clauses in contracts negotiated under these statutes. 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 
(1951) (remarks of Rep. Hardy). 
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bill in its entirety, he nevertheless had the votes to circum-
scribe the inquiry that the Comptroller General was author-
ized to undertake. Moreover, to accept the Government's 
contention that the amendment had no substantive effect 
would contradict the settled principle of statutory construc-
tion that we must give effect, if possible, to every word of the 
statute. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De 
La Cuesta, 458 U. S. --, -- (1982). Therefore, in our 
attempt to give meaning to the words "directly pertinent," 
we must be mindful of Congress' aim to protect contractors 
from broad-ranging governmental intrusion into their private 
business affairs. 
It does not follow, however, that our interpretation of the 
language added by the Hoffman amendment must be guided 
solely by that policy, for it is expressive of only one of the 
aims embraced by Congress in enacting the access-to-records 
provisions. The legislative history also reveals that Con-
gress sought, in granting the GAO this access authority, to 
equip that agency with a tool to detect fraud, waste, ineffi-
ciency, and extravagance in government contracting gener-
ally. Rep. Hardy, the sponsor of the legislation, explained 
that the two major purposes of the bill were "to give the 
Comptroller General the tools to do the job the Congress has 
instructed him to do . . . and . . . to provide a deterrent to 
improprieties and wastefulness in the negotiation of con-
tracts." 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951). With regard to the 
former purpose, it is clear that Congress envisioned use of 
the access authority as an adjunct to the Comptroller Gener-
al's statutory responsibility to "investigate ... all matters 
relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of pub-
lic funds" and to "make recommendations looking to greater 
economy or efficiency in public expenditures." 31 U. S. C. 
§53(a). See also 31 U. S. C. § §60, 65(a).8 Obviously, 
8 Rep. Hardy further explained the inspiration for the bill. Because of 
the absence of competitive safeguards when the Government procures by 
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broad access to cost records would enhance the GAO's ability 
to evaluate the reasonableness of the price charged the Gov-
ernment and to identify areas of waste and inefficiency in 
procurement. 
Because of the lack of debate or discussion of the Hoffman 
amendment, however, we do not have any indication in the 
legislative history, nor indeed in the language of the statute 
itself, of the parameters of the area of access authority left to 
the GAO after the restrictive words were added to the bill. 
In defining the degree of limitation, we thus traverse un-
charted seas guided only by the two general statutory pur-
poses reflected in the legislative history. Consequently, our 
task in construing the statutes as they apply in this action is 
to give effect to both of these congressional aims. The ten-
sion between these goals is apparent. For some industries 
and some types of contracts, including perhaps those at issue 
here, neither objective can be achieved fully without sacrific-
ing the other. 9 Given these dual, conflicting aims, we must 
negotiation rather than by formal solicitation of bids, Rep. Hardy identi-
fied a need to establish "every reasonable safeguard against waste and ex-
travagance in the spending of" government funds in the context of negoti-
ated contracts. 97 Cong. Rec. 13198 (1951). By permitting the GAO "to 
check the transaction both from the Government records and the contrac-
tors' books," the bill would ensure that the Government did not "come out 
on the short end of the deal." Ibid. Rep. Hardy then cited a number of 
"typical situations in which the authority of this bill would play an effective 
part." Ibid. One example dealt with detection of an inefficient market 
structure under which, because the Government was purchasing automo-
tive parts from a dealer who in turn bought from a middleman, the Govern-
ment was paying a price that included "profits upon profits and completely 
wasteful administrative and handling costs." Ibid. 
Thus, contrary to Merck's assertion, the 1951 access statutes were de-
signed to detect more than fraud and abuse in the negotiation of procure-
ment contracts. Rep. Hardy himself remarked that GAO review under 
the access provisions would disclose "a lot of other situations besides those 
involving fraud." Id., at 13199. 
9 It is possible that the 1951 Congress was aware of this tension. The 
addition of the Hoffman amendment was a clear compromise. Rep. Hoff-
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balance the public interest served by full GAO investigations 
against the private interest in freedom from officious govern-




The Government contends that the Court of Appeals erred 
man had adamantly opposed the Hardy bill from the outset because of the 
breadth of authority it would give to the GAO. The amendment he offered 
emerged from a discussion between Rep. Hardy and Rep. Hoffman and 
represented the extent of the limitation upon GAO's access authority that 
Rep. Hardy would accept. See 97 Cong. Rec. 13377 (1951) (remarks of 
Rep. Hoffman). 
It does not follow, as JUSTICE WHITE assumes, post, at--, from the 
fact that the Hoffman amendment was a compromise that the restrictive 
language is to be given no effect at all. In dissent, JusTICE WHITE refers 
to the Hoffman amendment as "largely a sop to the bill's opponents." 
Post, at --. The legislative record, however, tells us that a majority 
voted for the Hoffman amendment, and we must give weight to the ex-
pressed will of a legislative majority. JUSTICE WHITE also interprets the 
Hoffman amendment "as an assurance that the bill would not be used as a 
basis for inspection of books and records having no substantial connection 
with government procurement." Post, at --. Notwithstanding this 
recognition of the amendment's purpose, however, JUSTICE WHITE adopts 
a construction of "directly pertinent" that completely eviscerates the limit-
ing purpose of the Hoffman amendment, for he would allow the GAO access 
to any records helpful in determining the amount of profit being made by 
the contractor. See post, at--. Thus, under the guise of "interpreta-
tion" of the statute, JUSTICE WHITE has "construed" the statute so broadly 
as to give it a reading indistinguishable in effect from the bills to expand 
the GAO's access authority that were rejected by Congress in the 1970's. 
See note 11, infra. Such an approach therefore bespeaks legislation, 
rather than interpretation. 
Recognizing the extreme encroachment upon the privacy of a contrac-
tor's business records which his interpretation of the statutes would per-
mit, JUSTICE WHITE attempts to bring "balance" and "reason" to bear on 
the situation by invoking court's powers under Fourth Amendment princi-
ples to limit the GAO's right of access. Post, at--. If, however, Con-
gress had intended the GAO demands to be limited only by the Fourth 
Amendment, it need not have concerned itself with requiring that records 
be directly pertinent to the contract. 
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in holding that records of Merck's indirect costs 10 are not "di-
rectly pertinent" to the contracts in question. In so arguing, 
the Government maintains that Merck's indirect costs are di-
rectly pertinent to the fixed-price contracts because Merck 
uses payments made by the Government under these con-
tracts to defray indirect expenses. Thus, the Government 
would have us define as "directly pertinent" the records of 
any costs defrayed from commingled general revenues that 
include government payments under the contract. 
We cannot accept this interpretation of the statute, how-
ever, for it completely eviscerates the congressional goal of 
protecting the privacy of the contractor's business records. 
Under the Government's proposed definition, records of ex-
penditures to purchase raw materials for the manufacture of 
an entirely different product than that sold under the govern-
ment contract or to invest in the stock of another corporation 
would be subject to inspection by the Comptroller General. 
Hence, the Government's interpretation would permit far-
ranging governmental scrutiny of a contractor's business 
records of nongovernmental transactions completely unre-
lated to either the contract underlying the access demand or 
the product procured under that contract. Indeed, carried 
to its logical extreme, the argument would dictate that few, if 
any, of a private contractor's business records would be im-
mune from GAO scrutiny. In short, the Government's pro-
posed definition of the statutory language admits of no doc-
trinal limitation, effectively reading the Hoffman limiting 
language and its "anti-snooping" policy out of the statute. 
B 
Nor are we persuaded by the Government's argument that 
the GAO's consistent and longstanding interpretation of its 
10 By indirect costs we mean costs incurred in the areas of research and 
development, marketing and promotion, distribution, and administration, 
which are not directly attributable to a particular product. 
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authority under the access-to-records statutes supports the 
view that indirect cost records are subject to examination 
under the fixed-price contracts in question here. Even if 
that interpretation could be characterized as consistent, it 
would not be entitled to deference, for, as we have noted 
above, it is inconsistent with the statutory language. See 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 
411 (1979). 
Moreover, to characterize the GAO's current sweeping 
view of its access authority as "consistent" would be gener-
ous. There is significant evidence indicating that in the past 
the GAO itself has acknowledged a deficiency in its statutory 
authority to examine indirect cost records. 11 For example, 
11 It is significant to note that the profit study of the defense industry, 
which Congress authorized as part of the Military Appropriations Act of 
1970, Pub. L. 91-121, § 408, 83 Stat. 204, is the only occasion on which Con-
gress has deliberately granted the GAO the kind of broad-ranging author-
ity it asserts here. In conferring this authority, Congress, wary of equip-
ping the GAO to conduct a "fishing expedition," 115 Cong. Rec. 25795 
(1969) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff), carefully limited such authority to "only a 
single study." !d., at 25793 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire). 
Although not conclusive with respect to interpretation of the 1951 access 
statutes, subsequent c·ongressional rebuffs of GAO requests for expansion 
of its access authority are instructive both with regard to the GAO's view 
of the limits of the 1951 legislation and Congress' apparent reluctance to 
broaden that legislation. For example, a Senate bill introduced in 1973 
directed that "the Comptroller General ... shall ... have access for the 
purpose of audit and examination to any books, documents, papers and 
records ... which in the opinion of . .. the Comptroller General may be 
related or pertinent to the ... contracts ... [or] subcontracts." S. 2049, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (emphasis added). Another Senate bill which, 
like S. 2049 never emerged from committee, would have granted the 
Comptroller General authority to undertake a study of profits made on 
government and commercial contracts by contractors having government 
contracts aggregating $1 million or more. To enable the Comptroller Gen-
eral to make such studies, the bill gave him the authority to demand from 
the contractor "such information maintained in the normal course of busi-
ness . . . as the Comptroller General determines necessary or appropri-
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in a ruling of particular significance for the facts of this case, 
the Comptroller General determined in 1967 that the access 
provisions do not confer upon the GAO the right to examine 
records relating to a contractor's nongovernmental business, 
even when such review is necessary to determine whether a 
catalog-priced item was actually sold in substantial quantities 
to the general public. App. 162a-163a. Moreover, in late 
1969, the GAO prepared a memorandum for Congress in con-
nection with congressional consideration of a proposed grant 
of additional access authority to the GAO to pursue a study of 
contractor profits in the defense industry. In the memoran-
dum, the GAO informed Congress that its authority under 
the 1951 access provisions did not extend to review of records 
of a contractor's nongovernmental business and that addi-
tional access authority was therefore necessary to conduct a 
profit study. 115 Cong. Rec. 25800-25801 (1969) (reprinting 
GAO Memorandum on the Adequacy of the Legal Authority 
of the Comptroller General to Conduct a Comprehensive 
Study of Profitability in Defense Contracting). Finally, a 
1970 internal memorandum also reveals the GAO's belief that 
amendment of the 1951 access statutes would be necessary to 
give it the power to examine records of indirect costs. App. 
160a-161a. 12 
The only statements by the GAO directly supportive of its 
position here occur in testimony before a congressional sub-
committee in 1963 regarding the GAO's litigation of the scope 
ate. " S. 3014, 93d Cong. , 2d Sess. (1974). See also S. 2268, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1975). 
12 We observe that JuSTICE WHITE's dissent makes no attempt at all to 
deal with this evidence of the GAO's own view of the limits of its access 
authority. Given the GAO's historic position, excepting of course its posi-
tion in the Hewlett-Packard case and the current litigation, see infra, con-
tractors like Merck who entered into fixed-price negotiated contracts with 
the Government had no reason to expect that consenting to inclusion of the 
access-to-records clause would subject their businesses to the kind of 
broad-ranging inquiry which JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent approves. 
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of its access authority in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United 
States, 385 F. 2d 1013 (CA91967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 988 
(1968). 13 In light of the GAO's litigation posture during these 
hearings, as well as the contrary expressions of GAO opinion 
noted above, this testimony cannot provide persuasive evi-
dence of the GAO's consistent interpretation or practice. 
IV 
To summarize, the Government has failed to offer a defini-
tion of "directly pertinent" that would give any effect to the 
limiting purpose of that language. In our view, the appro-
priate accommodation of the competing goals reflected in the 
13 Hewlett-Packard, like this case, involved a request by the Comptroller 
General to review cost records of a contractor who entered into fixed-price 
negotiated contracts. During that litigation, a congressional subcommit-
tee commenced hearings to investigate "the need for, or desirability of, 
recommending legislative action" in light of Hewlett-Packard's refusal to 
permit inspection of its cost records under the access provisions. Hear-
ings on Relation of Cost Data to Military Procurement Before the Sub-
committee for Special Investigations of the House Committee on Armed 
Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). During the course of these hear-
ings, Robert Keller, General Counsel of the GAO, testified concerning the 
GAO's position with respect to the Hewlett-Packard situation. 
"It is our position that the contract clause and the statute give us the 
right to examine the cost records of the contractor and other pertinent data 
that relates [sic] to items included in the contract, in sufficient complete-
ness and detail to permit us to determine the reasonableness of the negoti-
ated prices." ld., at 10. 
Mr. Keller further stated that the GAO could "go beyond direct manufac-
turing costs" into such areas as "how research costs are allocated as be-
tween the Government contract and commercial business." Id., at 23. 
In legislative hearings in 1965, which in part addressed "the extent of the 
GAO's right to examine contractor books and records," Hearings on Comp-
troller General Reports to Congress on Audits of Defense Contracts Before 
the Subcommittee on Military Operations of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965), the Comptroller Gen-
eral again referred to his position in the Hewlett-Packard case, which was 
still pending in the courts, regarding the proper interpretation of the ac-
cess provisions. Id., at 45. 
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legislative history counsels us to draw the line precisely 
where both lower courts have drawn it. Thus, under the 
four fixed-price contracts in question, the Comptroller Gen-
eral should be permitted access to records of direct costs 14 
but barred from inspecting records of indirect costs. 
Direct costs certainly pertain directly to even a fixed-price 
contract, for direct costs are, by definition, readily identifi-
able as attributable to the specific product supplied under the 
contract. Consequently, as a rational businessman, the con-
tractor will have some regard for these costs in setting even a 
catalog price in order to avoid a loss on the product. Be-
cause these costs therefore have a very direct influence on 
the price charged the Government, the GAO would need to 
examine records of these costs to determine whether the con-
tractor is making an excessively high profit or the Govern-
ment is getting a "fair deal" under the contract. Presum-
ably, indirect costs also influence in some manner the setting 
of a catalog price, although to what extent is unclear, given 
the somewhat arbitary accounting allocations that must be 
made to determine what portion of indirect costs may be at-
tributed to a specific product. Nevertheless, the degree of 
intrusion into the contractor's private business affairs 
ocassioned by GAO scrutiny of indirect cost records is far 
greater, particularly where pure fixed-price contracts are in-
volved. Such an inspection would entail exposure to the 
GAO of many of the contractor's nongovernmental transac-
tions. 16 We therefore conclude that the appropriate balance 
14 Direct costs would include direct manufacturing and overhead costs in-
curred in producing the specific drug items procured under the four 
contracts. 
16 By contrast, where the contract that serves as the predicate for the 
GAO's access demand is cost-based-as in a cost-plus contract-the con-
tractor is in no position to complain of the intrusiveness of GAO inspection 
of indirect cost records. By claiming from the Government full reimburse-
ment for these costs under the cost-based contract, the contractor repre-
sents that these costs are justified as attributable to the performance of the 
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of public and private interests in this situation weighs in 
favor of access to direct cost records but against access to 
Merck's indirect cost records. 16 Our decision in this regard is 
in accord with that of the majority of the courts of appeals to 
have considered this issue. 17 
The Government objects strenuously that barring such ac-
cess impermissibly constrains the GAO in its efforts to im-
prove the procurement process. In an industry in which in-
direct costs represent such a large proportion of total costs, 18 
access to records of those costs is critical to an understanding 
of the industry with which the Government is dealing and to 
an assessment of the fairness of the contract price and the ad-
visability of continued adherence to the negotiated procure-
ment methods employed under those contracts. 19 
government contract, and not to any nongovernmental transactions. 
Therefore, the public interest served by permitting the GAO to inspect 
records supporting these claims clearly outweighs any privacy interests 
the contractor possesses in those records. 
16 JUSTICE WHITE suggests that, when indirect cost records relate both 
to governmental and nongovernmental transactions, the GAO should be 
permitted access to the records of any indirect costs that it can prove had a 
direct and substantial impact on the price charged to the Government 
under the contract. Post, at--. This approach is unworkable for both 
the Government and contractors. To decide these "close questions" of di-
rect pertinence, the parties to the fixed-price contract may be forced tore-
sort to the courts. Bright line rules upon which the parties' expectations 
may be firmly established are preferable to the protracted litigation that 
JUSTICE WHITE's suggestion would engender. 
17 In addition to the decision below, see SmithKline v. Staats, 668 F. 2d 
210 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, Nos. 81-2082, 81-2268, and Bristol Labora-
tories Division of Bristol-Myers Co. v. Staats, 620 F. 2d 17 (CA21980) (per 
curiam), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 451 U. S. 400 (1981). See also 
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. United States, 385 F. 2d 1013 (CA9 1967), cert. 
denied, 390 U. S. 988 (1968) (permitting access to records of direct produc-
tion costs, including direct material, direct labor, and overhead costs). 
18 The Government suggests that direct costs may represent as little as 
9% of the sales price of a pharmaceutical product. Brief for Petitioners in 
No. 81-1273, p. 34. 
19 We observe, however, that the Government has conceded in this action 
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There is no doubt that our holding wiil impede the GAO to 
some extent in the fulfillment of its statutory responsibil-
ities. 20 As we have already noted, however, in adopting the 
Hoffman amendment, Congress was apparently willing to 
forego the benefits that might be gained from permitting the 
GAO broad access to the contractor's business records in 
order to protect those contractors from far-reaching govern-
mental scrutiny of their nongovernmental affairs. By inclu-
sion of that language, Congress injected into the determina-
tion of which records are accessible considerations besides 
the Government's need for the information. Thus, any 
impediment that our holding places in the path of the GAO's 
power to investigate fully government contracts is one that 
Congress chose to adopt, and any arguments that this situa-
tion should be changed must be addressed to Congress, not 
the courts. 21 
v 
We address briefly Merck's contention that there is yet an-
other independent ground upon which the Comptroller Gen-
that it has no reason to suspect that Merck has engaged in any fraud or 
impropriety in connection with the negotiation or performance of these 
contracts. App. 41a-44a, 76a. Nor does the Government have any rea-
son to believe that the prices charged under these contracts were unrea-
sonable in any way. !d., at 42a, 76a. In fact, the price under each of the 
contracts was the lowest price at which Merck sold each of the products to 
anyone at the time the contracts were awarded. !d., at 26a, 42a. 
20 The extent of that burden is, however, unclear. In fact, in testimony 
before Congress the Comptroller General candidly expressed doubts about 
the usefulness of access to records of indirect costs in the pharmaceutical 
industry, suggesting that the attempt to determine from these records the 
portion of indirect costs allocable to individual drug products would be "a 
waste of time." Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry 
Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on 
Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 8578 (1972). · 
21 The GAO's own recognition of this dilemma has prompted it, as out-
lined in note 11 supra, to seek expanded access authority from Congress. 
Its efforts for expansion are more appropriately directed to that forum. 
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eral should be denied access to any of its cost records. 
Merck argues that the GAO is not entitled to examine these 
records because the access demand was not made for a con-
gressionally authorized purpose. Specifically, Merck con-
tends that the access-to-records statutes do not permit the 
Comptroller General to request records for the purpose of ei-
ther conducting an economic study of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry or securing information desired by individual mem-
bers of Congress. 
Much of what we have already said provides an answer to 
this contention. The legislative history reveals that Con-
gress granted the GAO authority to examine directly perti-
nent records under individual procurement contracts in order 
to assess the reasonableness of the prices paid by the Govern-
ment and to detect inefficiency and wastefulness. Given this 
authorized purpose, there is no reason to conclude that the 
GAO may not compile the information that it may lawfully 
obtain, within the statutory limits outlined above, from an in-
vestigation of individual contracts in order to arrive at a pic-
ture of the pharmaceutical industry generally. 22 Moreover, 
the fact that two senators encouraged the GAO to use its law-
ful authority to the fullest extent possible is irrelevant. The 
GAO is an independent agency within the legislative branch 
that exists in large part to serve the needs of Congress. If 
the records sought by the GAO are within the scope of the 
22 The record indicates that compilation of information lawfully obtainable 
under its access authority is what the GAO intended to accomplish. One 
GAO official explained: "[l]f we were to use our right of access under speci-
fied Federal contracts, we would attempt, insofar as possible, to present a 
report similar to that which we had proposed to present under the April 
1974 proposal [for the second phase of the economic study of the pharma-
ceutical industry]." App. 154a-155a (emphasis added). GAO officials 
also recognized that the statutory restrictions on its access authority would 
necessitate some changes in the approach contemplated under the prior 
two-phase study based on the voluntary participation of the pharmaceutical 
companies. Ibid. 
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access-to-records provisions, the fact that the Comptroller 
General's request had its origin in the requests of congress-
men or that the GAO reported the data to Congress does not 
vitiate its authority. 
VI 
Because of the GAO's mandate to detect fraud, waste, in-
efficiency, and extravagance through full audits of govern-
ment contracts, we cannot accept Merck's view that the only 
records directly pertinent to the four fixed-price contracts at 
issue are those necessary to verify that Merck actually had an 
established catalog price for the item procured, that it sold 
the items in substantial quantities to the general public at the 
catalog price, that it delivered the product specified, and that 
it received from the Government no more than the amount 
due under the contract. On the other hand, given the policy 
of protecting the privacy of contractors' business records also 
expressed in the statutory language and legislative history, 
neither can we accept the Government's contention that it 
must be permitted access to all of Merck's cost records. Ac-
cordingly, we affirm the judgment below. 
It is so ordered. 
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Dear Sandra: 
Although I will be happy to join your alternative 
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that we agree with the holding of the District Court that 
access is barred "with respect to research and development, 
marketing and promotion, cHstributi.on, ann administration .. 
costs, except to the extent such data fairly may be included 
in costs directly related to the particular contract. I 
think this is a corr~ct reading of the DC opinion and order . 
See Pet. for rert., pp. 39a-40a. 
I a1so suggest omission of the first full sentence 
on page 17. If this Court says that "our holding will im-
peoe the GAO • • • ", the GAO may think \-Te are suggPstinq it 
should ask Congress to amPnd the statute. I would hesitate 
to invite changes in the statute . 
You are to be commended on accomplishing what I 
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Sincerely , 
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I appreciate your thoughts on the alternative draft and 
plan to accommodate both requests in the next draft. 
With respect to your suggestion that we include the 
District Court's language, I plan to revise the language at 
the top of page 15 of the opinion as follows: 
"Thus, under the four fixed-price contracts in 
question, the Comptroller General should be permitted 
access to records of direct costs. He should be 
barred, however, from inspecting records of costs 
incurred in the areas of research and development, 
marketing and promotion, distribution, and 
administration, except to the extent the contractor has 
allocated these costs as attributable to the particular 
contract." 
To be consistent, I will also plan to add the "except" 
language used by the District Court to the quotation of the 
District Court language on page 5 of the opinion. That 
sentence would then read: 
"The court barred access, however, to records 'with 
respect to research and development, marketing and 
promotion, distribution, and administration (except to 
the extent such data may be included in the cost items 
listed above).'" 
I will also add to the definition of direct costs in 
footnote 14 a cross reference to the District Court's 
definition of direct costs quoted on page 5 of the opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
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